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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAMPON TAX *
Bridget J. Crawford **
Emily Gold Waldman ***
ABSTRACT
Thirty-five states impose a sales tax on menstrual hygiene products, while products like spermicidal condoms and erectile dysfunction medications are tax-free. This sales tax—commonly called the
“tampon tax”—represents an expense that girls and women must
bear on top of the cost of biologically necessary items that they need
in order to attend school, work, and otherwise participate in public
life. This article explores the constitutionality of the tampon tax and
argues that it is an impermissible form of gender discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause. First, menstrual hygiene products are a unique proxy for female sex, and therefore any disadvantageous tax classification of these products amounts to a facial classification on the basis of sex. There is no “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for taxing menstrual hygiene products, and so the tax
must fail intermediate scrutiny. Even assuming arguendo that the
tampon tax is not viewed as a tax on female sex, it is still unconstitutional because it cannot pass rational basis review.
Since 2016, four states and the District of Columbia have legislatively repealed their sales tax on menstrual hygiene products. One
state, Nevada, did so by ballot referendum in 2018. Other states will
consider repeal bills in upcoming legislative sessions or may consider ballot initiatives in the future. Women have also brought class
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action litigation in four jurisdictions, seeking declarations that the
state tampon tax is unconstitutional and requesting refunds of prior
taxes paid. The article develops the constitutional arguments that
can be used by litigators in any ongoing or future case, recognizing
that menstrual equity activism, including impact litigation, is
likely to continue in the future.
Ultimately, what and whom a society seeks to tax signal its larger
values. The continued imposition of state sales tax on menstrual
hygiene products, seemingly without a principled distinction from
other products that are exempted as necessities, exacerbates the aggregate economic inequality that already exists between the sexes.
The tampon tax is unconstitutional and should be repealed in all
states.
INTRODUCTION
“A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews,” Justice Antonin
Scalia famously wrote in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic. 1 Of course, the reality is more complicated. Although a special tax on wearing yarmulkes would be problematic, there is no
constitutional violation as long as retail sales of yarmulkes are
taxed like the retail sales of all other clothing. 2 Imagine, however,
that a state sales tax law exempted from taxation some items of
religious clothing, such as First Communion veils worn by girls
during a Roman Catholic religious rite, 3 or a turban worn by a Sikh
man as a symbol of commitment to his faith, 4 while still imposing
1. 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
2. States vary in their sales tax treatment of clothing. In Massachusetts, for example,
clothing under $175 is exempt from sales tax. See Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, A Guide to Sales
and Use Tax, MASS.GOV., https://www.mass.gov/guides/sales-and-use-tax [https://perma.cc/
8BDX-H7KN] (last visited Dec 1, 2018) (listing tax-exempt items “[f]ood & [m]eals” as well
as “[a]pparel & [f]abric [g]oods” less than $175). Maryland, in contrast, has an annual “Shop
Maryland Tax-Free Week,” typically coinciding with the start of a new academic year, when
“qualifying apparel and footwear $100 or less, per item, are exempt from the state sales
tax.” Comptroller of Maryland, Shop Maryland Tax-Free Week, MARYLANDTAXES.GOV, https:
//taxes.marylandtaxes.gov/Individual_Taxes/Individual_Tax_Types/Sales_and_Use_Tax/
Tax_Information/Shop_Maryland_Programs/Shop_Maryland_Tax-free_Week/ [https://per
ma.cc/7XBN-AQEN] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
3. See, e.g., SUSAN RIDGELY BALES, WHEN I WAS A CHILD: CHILDREN’S
INTERPRETATIONS OF FIRST COMMUNION 25–26, 157–62, 164–66 (2005) (describing the importance of veils worn by girls during the First Communion ceremony).
4. See, e.g., ELEANOR NESBITT, SIKHISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 48 (2d ed. 2016)
(describing the significance of turban for Sikh men); see also Sahar Aziz, Sticks and Stones,
the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 CUNY L. REV. 33,
47 (2009) (describing the mistaken similarities between turbans worn by some Muslims and
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the tax on yarmulkes. Such taxation clearly would amount to an
unconstitutional tax on Jews. 5
An analogous situation exists right now with many states’ treatment of menstrual hygiene products. Currently, thirty-five states
impose a sales tax on tampons, sanitary napkins, and similar products, while simultaneously exempting from taxation numerous
other items that are deemed necessities rather than luxuries. 6 For
example, Wisconsin exempts spermicidal condoms and erectile
dysfunction drugs from taxation, but taxes tampons and sanitary
napkins as luxury items. 7 Similarly, California treats various skin
cleansers, moisturizers, and baby oil as tax-exempt medical “necessities,” but taxes tampons and sanitary napkins as luxuries. 8
Until a recent change in the law, New York’s broad “medical supplies” sales tax exemption covered products ranging from dandruff
shampoo to foot powder to bandages—but not tampons and sanitary napkins. 9 Although this article urges and welcomes legislative
reforms and ballot initiatives to address these discrepancies, it focuses on further developing the constitutional argument against
“distinct turban styles of Sikhs,” although members of both groups “have suffered verbal
harassment and have been denounced as terrorists”); Neha Singh Gohil & Dawinder S.
Sidhu, The Sikh Turban: Post-911 Challenges to This Article of Faith, 9 RUTGERS J.L. &
RELIGION, no. 2, 2008, at i, i (“Members of the Sikh faith—the fifth largest religion in the
world—are required to wear a turban pursuant to religious mandate.”); cf. NESBITT, supra,
at 48 (describing wearing a turban as not a technical requirement of the Sikh faith).
5. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 270.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See WIS. STAT. § 77.54(14) (2011 & Supp. 2017) (exempting from sales tax “drugs”);
WIS. ADMIN. CODE TAX § 11.09(2)(k) (2018) (defining “drug” for purposes of section 77.54(14)
of the Wisconsin Statutes to include “medicated condoms”); id. § 11.09(2)(b) (defining
“drugs” to include “prescription medicines”); see also Jordan Gass-Poore’, Citing Gender
Bias, State Lawmakers Move to Eliminate ‘Tampon Tax,’ NPR (Mar. 6, 2016, 1:00 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/2016/03/06/467377295/citing-gender-bias-state-lawmakers-move-toeliminate-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/2P38-8L3E] (describing effort in Wisconsin to repeal the tampon tax).
8. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6369(b) (West 2010) (exempting from sales tax “medicines,” the definition of which includes “any substance or preparation intended for use by
external or internal application to the human body in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and commonly recognized as a substance or preparation intended for that use”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18 § 1591(a)(9)(B) (2016) (defining a “medicine”
as “[a]ny substance or preparation intended for use by external or internal application to
the human body in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease”).
Additionally, the code gives as examples of tax-exempt “medicines” baby lotion, oil, and powder, and also medicated skin creams. Id. § 1591(b)(1).
9. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3) (McKinney 2017) (exempting from sales tax medical
equipment and supplies “required for such use or to correct or alleviate physical incapacity,
and products consumed by humans for the preservation of health but not including cosmetics or toilet articles”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 528.4(b)(3) (2018) (listing Example 5 (dandruff shampoo) and Example 8 (foot powder)).
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existing state sales tax laws. Specifically, we argue that a tax on
menstrual hygiene products—when roughly analogous male or
unisex products are exempt on grounds of “necessity”—amounts to
an unconstitutional tax on women, because menstrual hygiene
products are so inextricably linked to female biology. 10 In other
words, in the same way that taxing yarmulkes while exempting
other religious clothing would be treated as a tax on Jews, the exclusion of menstrual hygiene products from the various “medical”
or seemingly necessity-based sales tax exemptions amounts to a
tax on women.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the scope and operation of sales tax generally and the tax on menstrual hygiene products particularly—i.e., the tax on tampons, sanitary pads, menstrual cups and similar items (commonly called the “tampon
tax”). 11 In so doing, we also discuss why menstrual hygiene products are indeed medically necessary. And we quantify the particular burden that the tampon tax—when added to the already significant expense of menstrual hygiene products themselves—imposes
on women. 12

10. See infra Part IV.
11. Government leaders in Australia recently agreed to eliminate the 10% goods and
services tax (“GST”) on menstrual hygiene products. See Eli Meixler, Australia Ditches
“Tampon Tax” After 18 Years of Outrage from Women’s Rights Groups, TIME (Oct. 3, 2018),
http://time.com/5413585/australia-ends-tampon-tax-gst/
[https://perma.cc/YCH3-L23K].
Earlier this year, the Australian Senate passed legislation that would exempt from the GST
“sanitary products,” defined as “tampons, pads, liners, cups, sponges and other products
used in connection with menstruation.” Treasury Laws Amendment (Axe the Tampon Tax)
Bill 2018 (Cth) sch 1 item 2 (Austl.). Some commentators predicted that political opposition
would prevent the change from occurring legislatively. See, e.g., Louise Yaxley, Senate Vote
to Scrap ‘Tampon Tax’ Won’t Stop Women Paying 10 Per Cent More for Sanitary Products,
ABC (June 18, 2018, 12:16 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-18/tampon-tax-tostay-despite-senate-voting-to-remove-it/9879382 [https://perma.cc/YCH3-L23K] (predicting
that the Australian legislation “is unlikely to pass in the House of Representatives because
the Coalition Government does not support the change”). Note that not all of those states in
the United States that exempt menstrual hygiene products from sales taxation adopt a definition that is as capacious as the Australian legislation’s. See, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of Revenue,
supra note 2 (containing separate lists of “exempt items” and “taxable items”). The Massachusetts statute and the Massachusetts Guide are silent as to the tax treatment of menstrual sponges and menstrual cups, but by inference, they likely are exempt from sales tax
as well. See id.
12. See infra Part I. We acknowledge at the outset the difficulty of talking about menstruation without excluding from the discussion transgender individuals and people across
the gender spectrum who menstruate. See, e.g., Gabriela Armuand et al., Transgender Men’s
Experiences of Fertility Preservation: A Qualitative Study, 32 HUM. REPROD. 383, 384 (2017)
(detailing the hormone regimen administered to transgender men who wished to resume
menstruation in order to become pregnant or to produce eggs for in vitro fertilization); Joan
C. Chrisler et al., Queer Periods: Attitudes Toward and Experiences with Menstruation in
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Part II describes the recent antitampon tax movement, which
started with public awareness and policy campaigns and then
spread to legislatures, courts and at least one direct appeal to voters. 13 We delve in particular into four class action challenges
brought in New York, Florida, California, and Ohio. 14 The New
York and Florida cases spurred legislative change and are no
longer active. 15 The California case has been dismissed. 16 The Ohio
case is temporarily inactive, pending an administrative appeal. 17
In neither California nor Ohio has the litigation inspired successful
repeal of the tampon tax. 18 Most recently, in January 2018, after
dismissing the case on procedural grounds, the Superior Court of
California rejected (in dicta) the argument that the tampon tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution or its state counterpart. 19
Parts III and IV provide an in-depth analysis of why the tampon
tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Among other things, this
article might serve as a road map for litigators attempting to challenge the tax as unconstitutional. Although particular application
of the argument will vary slightly by state (since each state sales
tax system has its own definitions and classifications), the underlying themes are broadly applicable and can be adapted as needed.
Part III describes the relevant background to equal protection
jurisprudence, with particular attention to the question of what
qualifies as unconstitutional sex discrimination. We discuss how
the analysis differs depending on whether the law makes a facial

the Masculine of Centre and Transgender Community, 18 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY
1238, 1239 (2016) (reporting that literature search resulted in zero scholarly articles concerning menstruation by transgender men). We have attempted to include multiple perspectives in our analysis. Although linguistically we have not managed to capture the full range
of the human experience with gender at each mention of “women” and menstruation, anyone
who has menstruated, does menstruate, or will begin or resume menstruation is impacted
by our analysis of the constitutionality of the tax on menstrual hygiene products.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B–E.
15. See infra Part II.B, C.
16. See infra Part II.D.
17. See infra Part II.E.
18. See infra Part II.D–E.
19. See infra Part II.D.
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sex classification or is facially neutral, since both of those frameworks are relevant to the tampon tax. 20 In so doing, we review significant Supreme Court decisions including Geduldig v. Aiello
(holding that the denial of insurance benefits for pregnant workers
was facially neutral, rather than a facial sex-based classification), 21 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (upholding a state law hiring preference for veterans, even though
men were more likely than women to be veterans), 22 and United
States v. Virginia (declaring the male-only admissions policy at the
Virginia Military Institute to be impermissible sex discrimination
because of the organization’s failure to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding women). 23
Part IV then advances the argument that the tampon tax is a
form of impermissible gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Because menstrual hygiene products are so closely
tied to female reproductive anatomy, their comparatively unfavorable tax treatment—in comparison with other roughly analogous
unisex and male items that receive tax exemptions as necessities—
amounts to a tax on women. Indeed, the principal equal protection
argument is that menstrual hygiene products are essentially a
proxy for female sex; therefore, the disadvantageous tax classification of these items amounts to a facial classification on the basis of
sex. 24 We thoroughly analyze why Geduldig need not—and indeed,
should not—be read as foreclosing this argument. We reach the
same conclusion under a facial neutrality/disparate impact analysis, because the tampon tax has a disparate impact on women and
likely is connected to indifference toward (or squeamishness about)
the female biological process of menstruation. 25 After all, shifting
menstrual hygiene products like tampons and sanitary napkins to
the list of tax-exempt necessities requires explicitly analyzing and
listing these products, while avoiding the issue leaves them in the
default “taxable” category. 26 Furthermore, because the tampon tax
should be analyzed as a sex-based classification, it should trigger
intermediate scrutiny, which it cannot pass. There is no “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding menstrual hygiene
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part III.
417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974).
442 U.S. 256, 269, 271, 281 (1979).
518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part I.B.
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products from the favorable tax exemptions afforded to other necessities. 27
Even assuming arguendo that the tampon tax is not viewed as a
tax on women for purposes of triggering intermediate scrutiny,
Part V develops the argument that the tampon tax is nevertheless
unconstitutional because it cannot pass rational basis review. The
exclusion of menstrual hygiene products from any list of “necessities” genuinely is irrational, given the clear evidence that they are
literally necessary for women to leave their homes, go to school or
work, and otherwise participate in society. Although a broad sales
tax base is desirable in order to generate the greatest amount of
revenue for the state, the negative expressive impact of the tampon
tax is far greater than any revenue these products could generate. 28
The article concludes by positioning tampon tax repeal efforts in
the context of larger efforts to eliminate discrimination. Ultimately, it is unfair to tax women on products that are necessary
for them to fully participate in society, while simultaneously exempting other items that are no more (and often less) necessary.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TAMPON TAX
A. The Workings of State Sales Tax
The state sales tax is familiar to most people. 29 For many, payment of the sales tax is a weekly or even daily occurrence. 30 In

27. See infra Part IV.C.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See, e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments During the Past Half Century, 39 VAND. L. REV. 961, 963 (1986) (describing development of state
sales tax during the period of 1932 to 1984).
30. See, e.g., Scott R. Baker et al., Shopping for Lower Sales Tax Rates tbl. 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23665, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893738 [https://perma.cc/4M46-9X5C] (showing in a multipleyear study of over 150,000 households the frequency of purchases of taxable and nontaxable
items is a rate of 0.041 times per month to 5.571 purchases per month). For a related study
of United Kingdom consumers, see Rachel Griffith et al., Consumer Shopping Behavior: How
Much Do Consumers Save?, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 102 (2009), finding in a survey of over
23,000 households in the United Kingdom for the calendar year 2006 the average household
acquired food and beverages every four days.
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forty-five states (all but Alaska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana) and the District of Columbia, 31 any time a consumer walks into a corner store and buys tangible property like a
newspaper or a pencil, the retailer must collect a sales tax equal to
a percentage of the property that is sold. 32 The consumer pays the
tax at the register and typically has no further interaction with the
sales tax system. 33
Mechanically, the state imposes on the seller the obligation to
collect the sales tax and then remit it to the state. 34 The amount of
the sales tax is determined by reference to the retail price of the
property sold. 35 State sales tax percentages range from approximately 2.9% to 7.25%. 36 Because local governments may impose
31. Alex Raut, States Without Income Tax Rely on Varying Forms of Revenue, TAX
FOUND. (Apr. 26, 2012), https://taxfoundation.org/states-without-income-taxes-rely-varying
-forms-revenue [https://perma.cc/QJ6P-V4R8] (listing Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New
Hampshire, and Oregon as states without sales tax). This has been true since at least 1984.
Compare Hellerstein, supra note 29, at 936 (“At the end of 1984, in contrast to the single
state that levied a general sales tax in 1932, the tax was in full force in forty-five states and
the District of Columbia—every state except Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire,
and Oregon”), with Taryn Hillin, These Are the U.S. States That Tax Women for Having
Periods, SPLINTER (June 3, 2015, 12:33 PM), https://splinternews.com/these-are-the-u-s-stat
es-that-tax-women-for-having-per-1793848102
[https://perma.cc/7F43-9L68]
(listing
Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon as those that do not have a sales
tax).
32. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. ROSEN & WALTER NAGEL, 1300 TAX MGMT. SALES & USE TAX
PORFOLIOS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 1300:01.B (describing the imposition, calculation, collection of states’ sales taxes). For one state’s public educational materials regarding the sales
tax, see Student Tax Educations Program—Teens and Taxes: Everyday Purchases, OHIO
DEP’T TAX’N, https://www.tax.ohio.gov/taxeducation/everyday_purchases.aspx [https://
perma.cc/D3V3-RFZ6] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
33. The sales tax is different from a use tax insofar as applicable state laws typically
impose a sales tax on the retail purchase of goods within the state, whereas a use tax is
“levied upon the use, storage, or consumption of tangible personal property within the state
if such property had not already been subject to the state’s sales tax.” 1 RICHARD D. POMP
& OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 6–39 (8th ed. 2015). For an overview of the
relationship between sales tax and use tax in the context of the recent decision by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018), see Adam
Thimmesch, More Post-Wayfair Thoughts: Sales Tax?, SURLY SUBGROUP (June 26, 2018),
https://surlysubgroup.com/2018/06/26/more-post-wayfair-thoughts-sales-tax/ [https://perma
.cc/6P7U-PFNX], focusing on South Dakota’s requirement that out-of-state sellers collect
sales tax and not use tax given sales in excess of an aggregate dollar amount or number of
sales, and critiquing the Court for having “unsettled some even longer-standing doctrine in
this area,” in part by collapsing the distinction between the sales tax and use tax.
34. See, e.g., 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 2213 (“Generally, the responsibility for the collection
of a sales tax is on the seller.”); ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note 32, § 1300.01.B.
35. ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note 32, § 1300.01.B.
36. See, e.g., JARED WALCZAK & SCOTT DRENKARD, TAX FOUND., STATE AND LOCAL
SALES TAX RATES 3 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180313143458/Tax-Founda
tion-FF572.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLY8-NXZN] (reporting that out of all states that have a
sales tax system, Colorado has the lowest rate at 2.9% and California has the highest rate
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their own sales tax on top of the state sales tax, the combined aggregate state and local sales tax rates range from 4.35% (Hawaii)
to 10% (Louisiana). 37 Nationwide, state sales tax generates more
revenue than state income tax does. 38 Indeed, many state budgets
are funded in greatest part by the sales tax. 39
In comparison to the sales tax system, state and federal income
tax regulations require individual taxpayers to file long and complex forms at least once a year, if not more frequently. 40 To many
at 7.25%).
37. See, e.g., id. at 2–3 (reporting that out of all states that have a sales tax system,
Hawaii has the lowest combined state and local rate at 4.35% and Louisiana has the highest
rate at 10.02%).
38. See, e.g., 2016 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/stc/2016-annual.html [https://per
ma.cc/8CW8-QMLY] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (reporting 2016 state sales and gross receipts
tax collections of more than $441 billion, but just over $391 billion in state income tax collections).
39. Id. In the five states that do not have a sales tax, other taxes serve as the main
source of revenue. Alaska, for example, collects a large percentage of its revenue from taxes
imposed on natural resources extraction. See, e.g., id. (reporting Alaska’s 2016 state tax
collection by category); see also Raut, supra note 31. Delaware relies on personal income
taxes, corporate franchise taxes, and a gross receipts tax, sometimes called the “hidden sales
tax,” imposed on the seller of goods and services in the state. Jonathan Starkey, Delaware
Taxes: Top 5 Sources of State Revenue, DEL. ONLINE: FIRST ST. POL. (May 19, 2014, 11:52
AM ET), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2014/05/19/delawaretax
es/9279693 [https://perma.cc/365S-S3KK]. A gross receipts tax is a tax on a company’s gross
revenues, without regard to source. Del. Div. of Revenue, Gross Receipts Tax Frequently
Asked Questions, DELAWARE.GOV, https://revenue.delaware.gov/frequently-asked-questions
/gross-receipts-tax-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/K8N3-WJTF] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). The Delaware rates range from 0.1006% to 0.7543%, based on the type of business. Id. The law
makes available an exclusion of the first $100,000 to $1,250,000 in gross monthly revenue,
again based on the type of business. Id. States may rely on revenue from forfeiture of abandoned property or state-run casinos and lotteries, as well. See Starkey, supra.
40. In response to calls for simplification of the federal income tax reporting requirements, the Treasury Department issued a much-anticipated “post-card” form, meant to be
smaller and more straightforward than the existing form. See, e.g., Lis Moyer, Treasury,
IRS Reveal a Postcard-Size Form to File Your Taxes, CNBC (June 29, 2018, 3:30 PM), https:
//www.cnbc.com/2018/06/29/treasury-irs-announce-postcard-size-form-1040-for-next-year.
html [https://perma.cc/CT3B-XWBP] (showing an image of the “postcard” return). Compare
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/f1040--dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXK2-ERB7] (draft of postcard-size U.S. Individual Income Tax Return) with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040,
U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K88Y-AZWW] (two-page U.S. Individual Income Tax Return). A shift to
filing by “postcard” is not considered salutary by most tax professionals and has been the
subject of some criticism. See, e.g., Francine Lipman (@Narfnampil), TWITTER (June 26,
2018, 1:05 PM), https://twitter.com/Narfnampil/status/1011702014353465344 [https://per
ma.cc/7CLF-M4CC] (calling the postcard tax return “a terrible application of form over substance”); Harry Stein (@HarrySteinDC), TWITTER (June 26, 2018, 6:37 AM), https://twitter.com/HarrySteinDC/status/1011604405437845505 [https://perma.cc/XU6U-6QKC] (“I’ve
been a tax preparer for 7 years. This new ‘postcard’ tax form is more than silly. People are
going to screw up their taxes because of it . . . .”).
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people, the income tax system seems arcane, inscrutable, and perhaps even unfair, as there is a not unfounded assumption that
well-advised individuals use sophisticated techniques to minimize
taxes in ways that the average taxpayer does not understand. 41
But the sales tax is salient, simple, and largely unavoidable. 42 It is
a lens through which one easily can identify inequality. 43
The sales tax is considered a regressive tax, in that it is not calibrated to ability to pay. 44 The degree of a sales tax system’s regressivity depends in large part on what items are exempt from the
sales tax. And indeed, almost every state classifies at least some
items of tangible property as tax-exempt. 45 States tend to describe
tax-exempt items in broad categories, such as medicines or groceries. 46 Generally speaking, items that tend to be exempt from state

41. See, e.g., Karyl A. Kinsey et al., Framing Justice: Taxpayer Evaluations of Personal
Tax Burdens, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 845, 867 (1991) (“[T]ax policies that allow people to lower
taxes legally serve in the aggregate to increase the perceived unfairness of the tax system.
These policies generate perceptions of unfairness among taxpayers who do not qualify for
the tax benefits they provide, without any offsetting reductions in perceived unfairness
among those who do qualify.”). Students studying tax laws frequently express such sentiments, as well. See, e.g., ROBERT W. MCGEE & GALINA G. PREOBRAGENSKAYA, ACCOUNTING
AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ASIA 315, 317 (2006) (reporting
results of survey of 134 Romanian students suggesting that the predominant view is that
tax evasion is morally acceptable when the tax system itself is unfair).
42. See, e.g., Mark J. Cowan, Nonprofits and the Sales and Use Tax, 9 FLA. TAX. REV.
1077, 1105 (2010) (discussing the ease of administration of collection of sales tax from retail
consumers); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 24 (2011) (“Tax salience is important because
of the common intuition, confirmed by some evidence, that taxpayers consistently perceive
themselves as paying less (or more) in taxes in response to certain forms of tax presentation.”); Hayes R. Holderness, The Unexpected Role of Salience in State Competition for Businesses, U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2017) (discussing the difference between “undersalient”
and “hypersalient” taxes on consumer behavior); Jacob Goldin, Note, Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258, 263
(2012).
43. See Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 546 (2017) (“It does not require any special training in
law or economics to understand that taxes on menstrual products mean less money left in
the female consumer’s pocket.”).
44. See, e.g., MABEL L. WALKER, WHERE THE SALES TAX FALLS 1 (1934) (calling the sales
tax an “upside down income tax” based on “inability to resist rather than ability to pay”);
Joseph R. Santoro & Caleb S. Fuller, Note, Reassessing the Fair Tax, 77 U. PITT. L. REV.
385, 393 n.57 (2016) (explaining that “the poor, on average, spend a higher percentage of
their income on consumer goods”); see also JOHN F. DUE, SALES TAXATION 39–40 (1957) (describing sales tax as striking more heavily the persons least able to pay). The critique of the
regressivity of the sales tax is as old as the sales tax itself.
45. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 42, at 1106.
46. See ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note 32, § 1300.05.D (describing “Special Types of Tangible Personal Property”).
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sales tax are those that are “necessities” of basic living. 47 But odd
discrepancies appear in what counts as a “necessity,” with thirtyfive states subjecting menstrual hygiene products to sales tax,
while simultaneously exempting products that are no more—and
often less—necessary by any estimation, as described in the next
section. Because of the clear burden that this differential sales tax
treatment imposes on women, it merits closer examination.
B. The State Tax Treatment of Menstrual Hygiene Products
There are fifteen states that do not impose sales tax on menstrual hygiene products, as of November 2018. Five of them are
states that have no sales tax at all. 48 Five more—Maryland, 49 Massachusetts, 50 Minnesota, 51 New Jersey, 52 and Pennsylvania 53—
specifically exempt menstrual hygiene products from taxation, and
have done so since before 2016, when other states began to respond
to rising public sentiment against the tampon tax. 54 These latter
five states that specifically exempt menstrual hygiene products
from sales tax accomplish the result in different ways.
For example, Maryland has a sales tax exemption for the sale of
“medicine” and “disposable medical supplies.” 55 Rather than bringing menstrual hygiene products within the definition of “medical

47. Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 496–97; see also ROSEN & NAGEL, supra note
32, § 1300.05.D.
48. See Raut, supra note 31.
49. MD. CODE ANN., TAX—GEN. § 11-211(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018).
50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64H, § 6(l) (2017), amended by 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 90, § 4
(listing medicine and specifically medically related products that are not subject to sales
tax).
51. MINN. STAT. § 297A.67(17) (2017) (exempting from sales tax “[s]anitary napkins,
tampons, or similar items used for feminine hygiene”).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-8.1(a)(5) (West 2017) (listing “tampons or like products”
as exempt from sales tax under general statutory heading “Exemption; medical”).
53. PA. CONS. STAT. § 7204(4) (2015 & Supp. 2018) (exempting from sales tax “sanitary
napkins, tampons or similar items used for feminine hygiene”).
54. See infra Part II.A.
55. MD. CODE ANN., TAX—GEN. § 11-211(a)(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018). According to the Comptroller of Maryland, “medicine” means “a preparation or substance intended to cure, mitigate, treat or prevent illnesses. Medicine includes prescription and nonprescription drugs, patent medicines, and oxygen sold for medical purposes.” Comptroller of
Md., Spotlight on Maryland Taxes, MARYLANDTAXES.GOV, http://taxes.marylandtaxes.gov/
Business_Taxes/Business_Tax_Types/Sales_and_Use_Tax/Tax_Information/Special_Situa
tions/Medicine_and_Medical_Equipment.shtml [https://perma.cc/WKQ7-CCZG] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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supplies,” however, the Maryland statute then has a separate exemption for “sanitary pads, tampons, menstrual sponges, menstrual cups, or other similar feminine hygiene products,” without
regard to the definition of medicine or medical supplies. 56
Massachusetts is somewhat different, in that the Massachusetts
sales tax exemption applies to “sales of medicine” and specifically
delineated items including artificial limbs, eyeglasses when prescribed by a doctor, oxygen masks, and baby oil. 57 Nowhere does
the statute mention a tax exemption for menstrual hygiene products. 58 Only by consulting the official Massachusetts Department
of Revenue Guide to Sales and Use Tax does one learn that taxexempt “health care items” include not only the items listed in the
statute but also “sanitary napkins and belts” and “tampons.” 59 Because the list of products in the statute and the guide are so similar, it may be that Massachusetts legislators were squeamish
about listing menstrual hygiene products in the statute itself. 60
Finally, the District of Columbia 61 and four states—Connecticut, 62 Florida, 63 Illinois, 64 and New York 65—repealed their tampon
56. MD. CODE. ANN., TAX—GEN. § 11-211(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018). Prior
to the enactment of Maryland Senate Bill No. 81, the exemption applied to “sanitary napkins or tampons” only. 2018 Md. Laws 525–26 (effective July 1, 2018).
57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64H, § 6(l) (2011 & Supp. 2018); 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 90, § 4
(effective May 21, 2018) (listing medicine and specifically medically related products that
are not subject to sales tax); see, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of Revenue.
58. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64H, § 6(l) (2011 & Cum. 2018); 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 90 §
4 (effective May 21, 2018).
59. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, supra note 2.
60. See id.
61. D.C. CODE § 47-2005(38)(A) (2018) (exempting from sales tax “feminine hygiene
products” defined as “sanitary napkin[s], sanitary towel[s], tampon[s], menstrual cup[s], or
sanitary pad[s]”). The District of Columbia City Council legislation that exempted menstrual hygiene products also created a new exemption for diapers. Id.
62. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-412(122) (2018) (exempting from sales tax “feminine hygiene
products” although the term is not defined further).
63. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(nnn) (2018) (exempting from sales tax “products used to absorb
menstrual flow” defined as “products used to absorb or contain menstrual flow, including,
but not limited to, tampons, sanitary napkins, pantiliners, and menstrual cups”).
64. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/3-5(37) (2016 & Supp. 2017) (exempting from sales tax
“menstrual pads, tampons, and menstrual cups”).
65. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3-a) (McKinney 2017) (exempting from sales tax “[f]eminine
hygiene products, including, but not limited to, sanitary napkins, tampons and panty liners”). From a drafting perspective, it is interesting that when the New York legislators repealed the tampon tax in 2016, they did so by adding this section “(3-a).” See id. Section 3
provides an exemption for drugs and medicines used “in the cure, mitigation, treatment or
prevention of illnesses or diseases . . . and supplies required for such use or to correct or
alleviate physical incapacity, and products consumed by humans for the preservation of
health but not including cosmetics or toilet articles.” Id. § 1115(a)(3). As a drafting matter,
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tax statutes in 2016 or 2017. 66 In 2018, voters repealed Nevada’s
tampon tax by ballot referendum; the repeal takes effect on January 1, 2019. 67 These jurisdictions all created a specific legislative
exemption from sales tax for menstrual hygiene products. 68 Each
of these jurisdictions now has a sales tax statute that treats menstrual hygiene products as a stand-alone category of exempt
goods. 69

legislators could have simply added the exemption for menstrual hygiene products as a new
subsection at the end of the list, or even added the exemption for menstrual hygiene products in the same place where it appears, but renumbered the subsections. See id. § 1115(a)(3a). Instead, the drafters chose to leave in place subsections (a)(3) (pertaining to drugs and
medicines) and (a)(4) (relating to prosthetics, hearing aids, eyeglasses and artificial devices
“to correct or alleviate physical incapacity in human beings,” and sandwich the new exemption between those existing subsections. Id. § 1115(a)(3)–(4). One possible interpretation of
this choice is that the drafters wanted to keep the exemption for menstrual hygiene products
physically clustered near the health-related exemptions and they thought that renumbering
the subsequent subsections would create more confusion than clarity. For a selection of
readings from which one might derive a list of best practices in legislative drafting, see, for
example, Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pt. 2), 66
STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and
Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and
Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2014); Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613
(2014); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014).
66. In 2016, the California legislature passed a repeal bill, but it was vetoed by Governor Brown. See Liam Dillon, Gov. Brown Vetoes Bill That Would Have Cut Taxes on Tampons and Diapers, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/
essential/la-pol-sac-essential-politics-updates-governor-vetoes-bills-to-repeal-sales-147379
0791-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/S9CH-9832] (reporting Governor Brown’s veto); see
also infra Part II.
67. An Act Relating to Taxes on Retail Sales Tax, S. 415, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev.
2017) (providing for a ballot referendum exempting “feminine hygiene products,” defined as
sanitary napkins or tampons, from state sales tax, which passed and is effective January 1,
2019); see also Anna North, Nevada Just Got Rid of Its “Tampon Tax,” VOX (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/11/7/18056648/nevada-question-2-tampon-tax-results [https://
perma.cc/TCW7-82V5] (reporting that Nevada voters approved repeal of state sales tax of
6.85% on sanitary pads and napkins). The ballot initiative passed by a 56.48% vote. Ballot
Questions, Statewide, SILVER ST. ELECTION, http://www.silverstateelection.com/ballot-quest
ions/ [https://perma.cc/2ZGH-2YAT] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). In Nevada, voter approval is
required for all amendments or repeal of the Nevada State Sales and Use Tax of 1955, currently in effect. See, e.g., NEV. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROVISIONS TO BE VOTED UPON IN STATE OF
NEVADA AT GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 6, 1956, at 13 (1956), https://www.leg.state.nv.
us/Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/1956.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VZ9W-34RB]
(providing for sales and use taxes in Nevada).
68. See, e.g., supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (describing Maryland’s separate
statutory sales tax exemption for menstrual hygiene products).
69. See supra notes 61–65 (citing newly enacted legislation in Connecticut, the District
of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, and New York).
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As noted above, the typical statutory division between taxable
and non-taxable items roughly tracks the distinction between “necessities” and “luxuries.” 70 For example, in Minnesota, the sales
tax exemption applies to groceries like flour, vegetables, poultry,
and eggs; 71 clothing such as t-shirts, rain ponchos, and belts; 72 prescription medicines; 73 and menstrual hygiene products. 74 But Min-

70. This would appear to be the basic approach adopted by Massachusetts where menstrual hygiene products, food, and articles of clothing below a certain threshold amount are
not taxed, but more expensive products are. See Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, supra note 2 (listing
tax-exempt items “[f]ood & [m]eals” as well as “[a]pparel & [f]abric [g]oods” less than $175);
see also Timothy R. Hurley, Curing the Structural Defect in State Tax Systems: Expanding
the Tax Base to Include Services, 61 MERCER L. REV. 491, 497 (2010) (explaining that sales
taxes apply to all tangible personal property unless specifically exempted); CHI., ILL., CODE
§ 3-40-2 (2018) (exempting tampons and sanitary napkins from Chicago’s Home Rule Municipal Retailer’s Occupation Tax, SO2016-705, Mar. 16, 2016; Edward M. Burke & Leslie
A. Hairston, sponsors) (vote by Chicago City Counsel to treat menstrual hygiene products
as “medical necessities” and thus exempt from local sales tax, in light of the State of Illinois’
previous classification of these products as “medical appliances”). The distinction between
necessities and luxuries is explicitly incorporated in the European Union’s Value Added
Tax. See, e.g., Council Directive 2006/112, art. 96–99, 131–63, 2006 O.J. (L 347) (EC) (setting
four categories—exempt, zero tax, reduced rate, and standard rate—with listed necessities
such as bread, flour, cheese, milk, and children’s clothing qualifying for no taxation or taxation at a reduced rate of not less than five percent, and luxuries subject to the standard
rate and taxed at the highest level). The difference between the categories of exempt and
zero tax is significant insofar as an item in the “zero” category can be moved up to one of the
higher tax categories (but cannot return to the zero category). See Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 497, 499 (explaining European VAT classifications and tax treatment of
menstrual hygiene products).
71. MINN. STAT. § 297A.67(2) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (exempting from sales tax “food and
food ingredients,” meaning “substances, whether in liquid, concentrated, solid, frozen, dried,
or dehydrated form, that are sold for ingestion or chewing by humans and are consumed for
their taste or nutritional value”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FOOD AND FOOD
INGREDIENTS SALES TAX FACT SHEET 102A (2017), http://www.revenue.state.mn. us/businesses/sut/factsheets/fs102a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AS4-9V4D] (giving examples of taxable
and non-taxable food and food ingredients); Jennifer Dunn, State by State: Are Grocery Items
Taxable?, TAX JAR: SALES TAX BLOG (Feb. 1, 2018), https://blog.taxjar.com/states-groceryitems-tax-exempt [https://perma.cc/EL7Z-KJVT] (showing map of states where groceries are
tax exempt).
72. MINN. STAT. § 297A.67(8) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (defining tax-exempt clothing as “human wearing apparel suitable for general use”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
CLOTHING SALES TAX FACT SHEET 105 (2009), http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/busi
nesses/sut/factsheets/fs105.pdf [https://perma.cc/GER9-JJMN] (listing clothing items that
are and are not subject to state sales tax).
73. MINN. STAT § 297A.67(7)(c)(1)(ii)–(iii) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (exempting from sales
tax “drugs,” meaning any item “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body”); see also MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, DRUGS SALES TAX FACT SHEET 117A (2017), http:
//www.revenue.state.mn.us/businesses/sut/factsheets/FS117A.pdf [perma.cc/Z52M-ZTKR]
(giving examples of nontaxable drugs); MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, GROOMING AND HYGIENE
PRODUCTS SALES TAX FACT SHEET 117F (2017), http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/busi
nesses/sut/factsheets/FS117F.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DFM-R22X].
74. MINN. STAT § 297A.67(17) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (“Sanitary napkins, tampons, or
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nesota imposes a sales tax on candied cake decorations, marshmallows, honey roasted nuts, and breath mints; 75 fur clothing and hair
bows; 76 and vaginal douches. 77
In the remaining thirty-five states, menstrual hygiene products
are subject to sales tax—while multiple other products are exempt. 78 In addition to exempting various necessities, many of these
states even exempt clear non-necessities. For example, Arizona
and Georgia exempt soda and candy from taxation, while imposing
sales tax on tampons. 79 Other unusual exemptions in jurisdictions
that tax menstrual hygiene products include tattoos and piercings
(Georgia), chainsaws (Idaho), bibles (Maine), doughnuts (Michigan), coffins (Mississippi), newspaper ink (Nevada), minor league
baseball souvenirs (New Mexico), garter belts (Vermont), and manicures (West Virginia). 80
These unusual exemptions underscore the oddity of simultaneously taxing a product that most females must use every month for
much of their lives in order to leave their homes. There is no debate
that tampons, sanitary pads, and similar menstrual hygiene products are necessities for women’s health; they absorb the flow of
menstrual blood. They are also necessary for numerous weeks after
childbirth to stop and absorb the flow of lochia. 81 Women without
similar items used for feminine hygiene are exempt.”).
75. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 71 (listing these items as taxable).
76. MINN. STAT § 297A.67(8)(c)(9) (2017 & Supp. 2018) (defining fur clothing by reference to section 297A.61(46) as “human wearing apparel that is required by the Federal Fur
Products Labeling Act, United States Code, title 15, section 69, to be labeled as a fur product,
and the value of the fur components in the product is more than three times the value of the
next most valuable tangible component”).
77. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 75 (listing as taxable feminine “douches,
wipes, sprays”).
78. See supra notes 48–69 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Susie Poppick, More States Tax Tampons than Candy in America, TIME
(June 3, 2015), http://time.com/money/3907775/states-tax-tampons-candy-america [https:
//perma.cc/S7DS-8ZQ2] (listing Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming as states where soda and candy are
tax-free but tampons are not); see also TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES: HOW DOES YOUR
STATE COMPARE? (2015), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/Fact&Figures_15_web
_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB28-2L2C].
80. See, e.g., Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, Menstrual Products Are Taxed in 40 States. Here’s
What You Can Buy Tax-Free, MS.: BLOG (Feb. 19, 2016), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2016/
02/19/menstrual-products-are-taxed-in-40-states-heres-what-you-can-buy-tax-free [https://
perma.cc/H6TM-J9LK].
81. See, e.g., L.W. Oppenheimer et al., The Duration of Lochia, 93 BRITISH J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 754, 755 (1986) (reporting median duration of lochia of thirtythree days in study of 236 women); Dan Sherman et al., Characteristics of Normal Lochia,
16 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 399, 399 (1999) (“Lochia is usually defined as sloughing of decidual
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such products must rely on unsanitary rags (which can cause serious infections), cut up their children’s diapers to create make-shift
pads, place unwieldy toilet paper or napkins in their underwear,
or even go without coverage. 82 A study by researchers at the Yale
University School of Medicine found that the use of tampons helps
to reduce the risk of endometriosis, so tampons may be health-enhancing for women. 83 In fact, the Food and Drug Administration
classifies tampons and sanitary pads as medical devices, underscoring their objective status as necessities. 84

tissue and is generally perceived as sequential vaginal discharge.”).
82. See, e.g., HOLLY SEIBOLD, TESTIMONY OF BRAWS: BRINGING RESOURCES TO AID
WOMEN’S SHELTERS, IN SUPPORT OF D.C. B21-0696, THE FEMININE HYGIENE AND DIAPERS
SALES TAX EXEMPTION AMENDMENT ACT OF 2016, at 3 (2016) (recounting oral reports by
women at a District of Columbia homeless shelter who resort to “using toilet paper, paper
towels, or diapers in lieu of sanitary pads or tampons as they are either cheaper or available
for free”). BRAWS was represented before the District of Columbia Council by Aysha Iqbal,
Shannon Cooper, and Leslie Benjamin, students in the Legislation Clinic at the University
of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, under the supervision of Professor Marcy Karin. See id. at 11; see also Helaina Hovitz, Tampons Are a Necessity, Not a
Luxury, VICE (May 24, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://impact.vice.com/en_us/article/j5e9qb/tamp
ons-are-a-necessity-not-a-luxury [https://perma.cc/D3B9-KNGY] (“Women who cannot afford menstrual products reported that they substitute with whatever they can find: toilet
paper, paper towels, rags, even dirty socks. Without access to period products, these women
are at risk for infection, making a lack of access to clean feminine hygiene supplies a health
issue and a human rights issue.”).
83. Erika L. Meaddough et al., Sexual Activity, Orgasm and Tampon Use Are Associated
with a Decreased Risk for Endometriosis, 53 GYNECOLOGICAL & OBSTETRIC INVESTIGATION
163 (2002) (reporting results of study of 2012 subjects); see also Use of Tampons and Sexual
Activity Protect Women Against Endometriosis, YALENEWS (May 29, 2002), https://news.ya
le.edu/2002/05/29/use-tampons-and-sexual-activity-protect-women-against-endometriosis
[https://perma.cc/7YCS-TQKP].
84. See 21 C.F.R. § 884.5425 (2018) (sorting into Class II scented or scented-deodorized
pads made with materials lacking an established safety profile); id. § 884.5435 (sorting into
Class I various unscented pads); id. § 884.5470 (sorting into Class II unscented tampons);
see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF—MENSTRUAL
TAMPONS AND PADS: INFORMATION FOR PREMARKET NOTIFICATION SUBMISSIONS (510(K)S),
at 13 (2005), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidan
ce/GuidanceDocuments/ucm071799.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX2Z-8983] (recommending that
disclosure of contents of pads and tampons meet the same standards as they apply to medical devices). The significance of a product’s placement into Class I or Class II is that “[m]ost
Class I devices and a few Class II devices are exempt from the premarket notification
[510(k)] requirements subject to the limitations on exemptions,” although other requirements may apply. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLASS I/II EXEMPTIONS (2018), https://www.
fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/overview/classifyyourdevice/ucm051
549.htm [https://perma.cc/G4AQ-HNUT]. “Premarket notifications” are submissions to the
FDA that demonstrate safety and effectiveness of a particular device. U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., PREMARKET NOTIFICATION 510(K), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregul
ationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/premarketsubmissions/premarketnotification5
10k/default.htm [https://perma.cc/BWC4-ALFM].
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The sales tax on menstrual hygiene products matters. Although
each individual woman differs, one recent study estimated that the
average woman spends roughly 2280 days (6.25 years) of her life
menstruating. 85 Given variations in rates of consumption and
price, the average woman might spend between $704 86 and $2000 87
on tampons and pads alone (excluding any tax) over the course of
a lifetime. 88 A woman might pay from $20 to $145 for state taxes

85. See, e.g., Jessica Kane, Here’s How Much a Woman’s Period Will Cost Her over a
Lifetime, HUFFPOST (May 18, 2015, 12:05 PM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/
18/period-cost-lifetime_n_7258780.html [https://perma.cc/JC6L-ZGP9] (“[T]he average
woman endures some 456 total periods over 38 years, or roughly 2,280 days with her period—6.25 years of her life.”). Another study suggests that a woman menstruates for an
average of 2535 days over the course of her lifetime. See Julitta Onabanjo, Celebrating Menstruation, from Menarche to Menapause, UNFPA (May 24, 2018), https://esaro.unfpa.org/
en/news/celebrating-menstruation-menarche-menopause [https://perma.cc/4K35-QVVR];
Karen Zraick, It’s Not Just the Tampon Tax: Why Periods Are Political, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/health/tampon-tax-periods-menstruation-nyt.
html [https://perma.cc/5DG2-CX94] (citing statistic that average woman menstruates 2535
days in a lifetime).
86. This calculation assumes an expense of $17.60 per year every year for forty years.
See, e.g., Gass-Poore’, supra note 7 (citing study by Euromonitor International that the average American woman spent $17.60 on tampons and pads in 2015).
87. Kane, supra note 85 (calculating that in the course of her lifetime, the average
woman will spend a lifetime average of $1773 on tampons, $443 on panty liners and $4555
on other items such as pain relievers and replacements for stained clothing). This concords
with our estimate of a woman’s lifetime expense for tampons and pads of $1732.80, calculated by assuming 2280 days of menstruation and use of three tampons and one pad per day
(for a total of 6840 tampons and 2280 pads per lifetime) and a cost of $0.21 per tampon and
$0.13 per pad. See Tampax Pearl Active Plastic Tampons, Light/Regular Absorbency Multipack, Unscented, 34 Count, 4 Boxes, (Total 136 Count), https://www.amazon.com/TampaxPlastic-Absorbency-Multipack-Unscented/dp/B077NL6SPR [https://perma.cc/9Z4G-HL LZ]
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (selling pack of four boxes of thirty-four tampons for $27.88, or
$0.21 per pad); Stayfree Ultra Thin Regular Pads with Wings For Women, Reliable Protection and Absorbency of Feminine Moisture, Leaks, https://www.amazon.com/Stayfree-Reli
able-Protection-Absorbency-Feminine/dp/B00NJNIY1C
[https://perma.cc/VR3P-9DKE]
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (selling pack of thirty-six absorbent pads for $18.89, or $0.13 per
pad); see also Victoria Hartman, Note, End the Bloody Taxation: Seeing Red on the Unconstitutional Tax on Tampons, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 313, 317 (2017) (“[S]ince nearly every
woman uses feminine hygiene products during her period, the additional cost imposed by
state sales tax on feminine hygiene products adds up.”). One estimate is that that every
British woman will pay an estimated 922 pounds over her lifetime in taxes on menstrual
hygiene products. Laura Coryton, Periods Come with £18,450 Price Tax. #EndTamponTax
Already!!, CHANGE.ORG (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.change.org/p/1550755/u/13003696
[https://perma.cc/B7JL-L2ZT] (showing an online petition urging women to oppose the
United Kingdom’s Value Added Tax on menstrual hygiene products). This is over $1200. See
Currency Converter, OANDA, https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ [https://perma.
cc/C62C-8TY6] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (using conversion rate of 1.30888 British pounds
per one United States dollar, the average for the twenty-four-hour period ending Thursday,
June 28, 2018, 22:00 UTC).
88. See, e.g., Gass-Poore’, supra note 7 (laying foundation to estimate the potential lifetime cost of the sales tax on menstrual hygiene products by estimating that the average
woman will have 450 periods in a lifetime).
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on top of that, allowing for price variation and state sales tax rates
that range from 2.9% to 7.25%. 89
Given this ability to quantify the tax’s financial harm, and given
that male-specific products including spermicidal condoms and
erectile dysfunction drugs are generally tax-exempt, 90 it is not surprising that many people have urged their state legislators to repeal the tampon tax as a matter of fairness and equality. Nor is it
surprising that they have turned to the courts to challenge the
tampon tax as a violation of equal protection. The next part examines and analyzes the four class action lawsuits that have been
filed so far. In each, the framing of the argument is slightly different, in order to track the particular state’s language. However, the
underlying shape and theme of the legal arguments are very similar.
II. CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
A. Background
On January 1, 2015, New York-based attorney and activist Jennifer Weiss-Wolf came home from an inspirational “polar bear
swim” on Coney Island and stumbled upon a request by some local
teens collecting tampons and pads for a food pantry. 91 Their drive
spurred her to begin thinking and writing about how menstruation
impacts actual lives, especially the lives of poor and vulnerable
women and girls. 92 Over the course of 2015, Weiss-Wolf emerged
as the leading voice in the United States for “menstrual equity,” a
term she describes as follows:
In order to have a fully equitable and participatory society, we must
have laws and policies that ensure menstrual products are safe and
affordable and available for those who need them. The ability to access

89. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. This estimate does not take into account
additional local taxes. It also does not take into account the cost of any menstruation-related
products or associated sales taxes. Menstruation-related products might include heating
pads, pain relief medication, or new underwear. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 85 (estimating
the total lifetime cost of a woman’s period, taking into account all related product needs, as
$18,171, without specifying whether the estimate builds in state and local taxation).
90. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
91. JENNIFER WEISS-WOLF, PERIODS GONE PUBLIC: TAKING A STAND FOR MENSTRUAL
EQUITY, at x–xi (2017) (describing the origins of her menstrual equity activism).
92. Id. at xiv–xvii.
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these items affects a person’s freedom to work and study, to be
healthy, and to participate in daily life with basic dignity. And if access is compromised, whether by poverty or stigma or lack of education
and resources, it is in all of our interests to ensure those needs are
met. Menstrual equity is still an evolving concept and goal. 93

In 2015, the menstrual equity movement gained significant traction. A massive online petition campaign helped prompt Canada’s
repeal of its national tax. 94 Taking a cue from activists in Canada,
Weiss-Wolf began a United States-based online petition, cosponsored by Cosmopolitan magazine, called No Tax on Tampons: Stop
Taxing Our Periods! Period. 95 In 2015, Kiran Gandhi ran the London Marathon while “free bleeding.” 96 Thousands of women took to
social media with the hashtag “#PeriodsAreNotAnInsult” to protest then-candidate Donald Trump’s attempt to discredit reporter
Megyn Kelly by saying, “[S]he’s not very tough and she’s not very
sharp. She gets out there and she starts asking me all sorts of ridiculous questions, and you could see there was blood coming out
of her eyes, blood coming out of her . . . wherever.” 97 Activists and
ordinary people around the globe brought so much attention to the
issue of menstruation that Cosmopolitan called 2015 “The Year the

93.
94.

Id. at xvi.
Tara Culp-Ressler, After Years of Backlash, Canada Ditches the ‘Tampon Tax,’
THINKPROGRESS (May 29, 2015, 3:50 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/after-years-of-backlash
-canada-ditches-the-tampon-tax-ed5cd867fbf4 [https://perma.cc/5XC2-QWGW] (citing number of signatories to an Internet petition as a factor leading to tampon tax repeal in Canada).
95. See Petition, No Tax on Tampons: Stop Taxing Our Periods! Period., CHANGE.ORG,
(Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.change.org/p/u-s-state-legislators-stop-taxing-our-periods-per
iod [https://perma.cc/D38W-DR4G]; see also Bridget Crawford, Interview with Jennifer
Weiss-Wolf, New York Attorney and Menstrual Equity Advocate, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2016/11/interview-jennifer-weisswolf-new-york-attorney-menstrual-equity-advocate/ [https://perma.cc/6PCA-6CMU].
96. Kiran Gandhi, Sisterhood, Blood and Boobs at the London Marathon 2015, MADAME
GANDHI (Apr. 26, 2015), https://madamegandhi.blog/2015/04/26/sisterhood-blood-and-bo
obs-at-the-london-marathon-2015 [https://perma.cc/3VQP-7ZHS] (“I ran with blood dripping down my legs for sisters who don’t have access to tampons and sisters who, despite
cramping and pain, hide it away and pretend like it doesn’t exist.”).
97. See, e.g., Laura Bennett, What Trump Really Meant When He Said That Megyn
Kelly Had “Blood Coming Out of Her Wherever,” SLATE (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:33 PM), https://
www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/10/megyn_kelly_blood_coming_out_of_her_wher
ever_comment_in_cnn_don_lemon_interview.html [https://perma.cc/K3DY-BPYV].
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Period Went Public,” 98 and National Public Radio declared it to be
“The Year of the Period.” 99
Menstrual equity activism continued well into the next two
years and is ongoing. Many students have begun to demand that
their colleges and universities provide free menstrual hygiene
products on campus. 100 An Ohio woman began the Free the Tampons Foundation, dedicated to the idea that “every bathroom outside the home should provide freely accessible items that people
98. Anna Maltby, The 8 Greatest Menstrual Moments of 2015, COSMOPOLITAN (Oct. 13,
2015), https://www.cosmopolitan.com/health-fitness/news/a47609/2015-the-year-the-period
-went-public/ [https://perma.cc/J9MY-DMJD] (citing Gandhi’s “free-bleeding” run, Canada’s
repeal of the tampon tax, and Trump’s comments about Megyn Kelly, along with a tennis
player’s public statement that she was menstruating during the Australian Open tennis
tournament, Instagram’s censoring of an artistic photograph of a woman with a menstrual
stain on her pants, a former White House Communications Director’s television statement
that she bled “every 28 days . . . but the country went on,” Apple’s update to include period
tracking in its “Health” app, and comedians Key and Peele’s “menstruation orientation”
routine directed at educating men).
99. See Malaka Gharib, Why 2015 Was the Year of the Period, and We Don’t Mean Punctuation, NPR (Dec. 31, 2015, 1:30 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015
/12/31/460726461/why-2015-was-the-year-of-the-period-and-we-dont-mean-punctuation
[https://perma.cc/JNA3-YQ74] (“This year has been epic for menstruation, with news and
social media catapulting the once hush-hush topic into the open.”); see also Hélène Bidard
(@Helenebidard), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2015, 8:52 PM), https://twitter.com/Helenebidard/sta
tus/664485866799108096 [https://perma.cc/9U8M-XM7H] (“Manifestation contra la taxe
tampon aujourd’hui place du Châtelet #Notaxontampons #Laissezmoisaigner #CulotteGate.” [“Protest against the tampon tax today at Châtelet Place #Notaxontampons #Letmebleed #PantyGate.”]); Reina Gattuso, 2015 Was the Year of the Period, and Happy to
Bleed and Pads Against Sexism Are on It!, FEMINISTING, http://feministing.com/2016/01/
05/2015-was-the-year-of-the-period-and-happy-to-bleed-and-pads-against-sexism-are-on-it
[https://perma.cc/VVY9-VBAB] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (describing work of student activists at Jamia Millia Islamia University of Delhi, India, who decorated the campus with
pads); Hayley Gleeson, Tampon Tax: Australian Debate Reignited After France Drops VAT
on Sanitary Products, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2016, 10:31 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/
2015-12-15/tampon-tax-france-reignites-debate-australia/7026836 [https://perma.cc/DK5PMG29] (describing protests in Paris where a woman “carried a clothesline swathed with
blood-stained underwear”).
100. See Kimberly Yam, Free Tampons, Pads Now Stocked in Bathrooms Across
Brown University Campus, HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:01 PM ET), https://www.huffington
post.com/entry/bathrooms-across-brown-universitys-campus-are-now-stocked-with-freetampons-pads_us_57d03400e4b0a48094a6df9e [https://perma.cc/ED97-AJBD]. Notably,
however, this was a decision by the Undergraduate Council of Students, not the central
university administration, to allocate funding to provide menstrual hygiene products. Id.;
see also Jake New, If Condoms Are Free, Why Aren’t Tampons?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 11,
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/03/11/students-demand-free-tampons-ca
mpus [https://perma.cc/P26A-N4C8] (detailing varying degrees of successful student activism designed to achieve bathrooms stocked with free menstrual hygiene products at the
University of Arizona, Columbia University, Emory University, and the University of California, Los Angeles); Diamond Naga Siu, Free Menstrual Hygiene Products Come to NYU,
WASH. SQUARE NEWS (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.nyunews.com/2016/10/24/free-menstrualhygiene-products-come-to-nyu [https://perma.cc/5BYW-6CFH] (describing pilot program at
New York University).
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who menstruate need for their periods.” 101 The Foundation works
with business owners to provide menstrual hygiene products for
their employees and guests. 102 Perhaps the most publicized local
success came in June 2016, when New York City Mayor Bill DiBlasio signed into law a measure passed by the City Council that
made available free menstrual hygiene products in all public
schools, city jails, and city-run homeless shelters. 103
At the state level, in 2016 and 2017, twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia considered bipartisan legislation to make
menstrual hygiene products tax-exempt. 104 Eight of those states
considered legislation in both years. 105 Legislation in New York,
Connecticut, Illinois, Florida, and the District of Columbia ultimately was successful; California legislation was vetoed by the

101. About, FREE TAMPONS, http://www.freethetampons.org/about.html [https://perma.
cc/2PRC-KZGJ] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (“We think menstruators shouldn’t have to worry
about an unexpected physical need becoming an overwhelming emotional ordeal . . . . The
organization is dedicated to providing education and resources that empower advocates to
create change for women nationwide.”).
102. Id. Another focus of menstrual equity activism is access by prisoners to menstrual
hygiene products. See, e.g., Mattie Quinn, New Federal Tampons Rule Follows States and
Cities’ Flow, GOVERNING (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.governing.com/gov-tampons-pads-pri
sons-states-federal.html [https://perma.cc/E6W8-WBAN]. On August 1, 2017, the United
States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons issued an “Operations Memorandum” requiring that federal prison wardens provide to inmates at no cost tampons and pads
in two sizes each, as well as pantiliners. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, No.
001-2017, PROVISION OF FEMININE HYGIENE PRODUCTS (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.bop.gov/
policy/om/001_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XHA-N84Q] (providing guidance applicable for
one calendar year beginning August 1, 2017, to all federal prisons housing female inmates).
103. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation Increasing
Access to Feminine Hygiene Products for Students, Shelter Residents and Inmates (July 13,
2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/611-16/mayor-de-blasio-signs-legisla
tion-increasing-access-feminine-hygiene-products-students [https://perma.cc/AFL7-9US7]
(including statement by Mayor de Blasio that, “[a]s a father, husband and feminist, I am
proud to sign these bills into law”).
104. See e.g., H.R. 2418, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017); H.R. 17-1127, 71st Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017); H.R. 7109, 2017 Leg., 119th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017); S.
502, 2016 Gen. Assemb., May Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2016); Council, 21-0696, 2016 Leg. Reg.
Sess. (D.C. 2016).
105. See Assemb. 9, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); H.R. 4129, 99th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2017); H.R. 61, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); H.R. 5377, 144th
Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017); H.R. 804, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017);
H.R. 71, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017); H.D. 1593, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2017); Assemb. 683, 2017–2018 Leg., 103d Reg. Sess. (Wisc. 2017); Assemb. 1561, 2015–
2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); H.R. 5234, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016); H.R. 272,
131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016); H.R. 7714, 144 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I.
2016); H.R. 2059, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016); H.R. 202, 61st Leg., Gen.
Sess. (Utah 2016); H.D. 952, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016); Assemb. 949, 2015–
2016 Leg., 102d Reg Sess. (Wisc. 2016).

CRAWFORDWALDMAN 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

460

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:37 PM

[Vol. 53:439

governor. 106 In 2018, Nevada voters voted in favor of eliminating
the sales tax on sanitary napkins and pads. 107 In future years, several states are expected to consider repeal legislation. 108
B. New York: 21st Century Class Action
Prior to 2016, New York was one of the jurisdictions that had
considered (but never passed) legislation to repeal the sales tax on
menstrual hygiene products. 109 In connection with her increasingly
national profile, Weiss-Wolf formed the nonprofit policy organization Period Equity together with attorney Laura Strausfeld. 110
106. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of Cal., to Members of the
Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
AB_717_Veto_Message.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PUB-VKRX] (explaining his veto in part because “tax breaks are the same as new spending -- they both cost the General Fund money.
As such, they must be considered during budget deliberations so that all spending proposals
are weighed against each other at the same time.”). The bill would have eliminated the sales
tax on diapers, as well. See, e.g., Jeremy B. White, Tampon, Diaper Taxes Will Endure in
California, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 13, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/polit
ics-government/capitol-alert/article101581562.html [https://perma.cc/C7HN-ASGR]. In
2017, Governor Brown did sign into law a diaper subsidy for certain low-income families
with children under the age of three years. See Assemb. 480, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2017); see also California Becomes First State to Subside Diapers After Governor Signs AB
480, EAST COUNTY TODAY (Oct. 13, 2017), https://eastcountytoday.net/california-becomesfirst-state-to-subsidize-diapers-after-governor-signs-ab-480 [https://perma.cc/56E2-EMN7].
107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
108. States that are likely to consider repeal legislation in 2019 include Arizona, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Ema Sagner, More States Move to End ‘Tampon Tax’ That’s
Seen as Discriminating Against Women, NPR (Mar. 25, 2018, 8:01 AM ET), https://www.npr.
org/2018/03/25/564580736/morestates-move-to-end-tampon-tax-that-s-seen-as-discriminat
ing-against-women [https://perma.cc/K73F-3F9Z] (including a graphic of states with pending tampon tax exemption legislation). In 2018, a Utah bill to repeal the tampon tax died in
committee. See H.B. 262, 62nd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Utah 2018) (proposing removal of sales tax
on menstrual hygiene products); see also Julia Ritchey (@juliaritchey), TWITTER (Feb. 21,
2018, 6:03 PM), https://twitter.com/juliaritchey/status/966493594583355392 [https://
perma.cc/V2FR-BRT8] (reporting by managing editor of Utah public radio station KUERFM that House Bill 262 failed in Utah House Revenue and Taxation Standing Committee
by vote of three to seven).
109. Manhattan Assemblywoman Linda Rosenthal introduced the first repeal legislation
in 2015. See Abigail Jones, New York Terminates the Tampon Tax, NEWSWEEK (July 21,
2016, 7:29 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-york-tampon-tax-cuomo-periods-tamponsmenstruation-donald-trump-482918 [https://perma.cc/N6KZ-6VJR] (providing a brief overview of New York’s tax treatment menstrual hygiene products, which had been subject to
taxation beginning with the enactment of the state sales tax regime in 1965); see also Linda
B. Rosenthal (@LindaBRosenthal), TWITTER (July 21, 2016, 11:10 AM), https://twitter.
com/LindaBRosenthal/status/756189723937439744 [https://perma.cc/SR8W-VMND] (“My
bill repealing #tampontax signed into law! We just axed the tax! Good riddance to sexist
tax.”). For a comparison of New York’s and Utah’s legislative approaches to tampon tax
repeal in 2016, see Gwenyth S. Gamble Jarvi, Note, Thank Hefner Erectile Dysfunction Is a
Medical Condition: A Period Piece, 15 PITT. TAX. REV. 181, 187–98 (2018).
110. PERIODEQUITY, https://www.periodequity.org/ [https://perma.cc/UQA8-MVT2] (last
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Strausfeld had been contemplating a legal challenge to the sales
tax on menstrual hygiene products, as New York legislators had
considered a repeal bill before, but the bill never made it to a
vote. 111 Period Equity persuaded a New York law firm to represent
five women in a class action lawsuit. 112
Attorneys filed the complaint in Seibert v. New York State Department of Taxation on March 3, 2016, in a New York state
court. 113 The plaintiffs alleged that the New York state sales tax
violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and
New York Constitutions and sought to permanently enjoin the
state from collecting sales tax on menstrual hygiene products. 114
The plaintiffs also sought restitution of an estimated $14 million
in sales tax collected in each of the preceding three years, as well
as attorneys’ fees and costs. 115
The complaint alleged that the New York state sales tax on menstrual hygiene products was not “substantially related to an important state interest” or even “rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose.” 116 In other words, the complaint argued that the
visited Dec. 1, 2018) (identifying the organization as “the nation’s first law and policy organization fighting for menstrual equity—committed to ensuring that menstrual products
are affordable, safe and available to those in need,” with Jennifer Weiss-Wolf and Laura
Strausfeld as cofounders).
111. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. The New York case was not the first
legal challenge to the sales tax on menstrual hygiene products in the United States. Over
twenty-seven years before, three women brought and won a class action in Illinois seeking
injunctive relief against local and state taxes. See Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc.,
544 N.E.2d 344, 355–56 (Ill. 1989) (holding that menstrual hygiene products should be classified as “medical appliances” for applicable tax purposes, and thus were exempt from taxation). For an analysis of the Geary case, see Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 531–
34, and see also Hartman, supra note 87, at 327–29, explaining post-Geary changes to the
law that led to the restoration of Illinois taxes on menstrual hygiene products in 2009, setting the stage for subsequent legislation in 2016 that affirmatively exempts menstrual hygiene products from taxation.
112. Bridget Crawford, Interview with Laura Strausfeld, New York Attorney Challenging
the “Tampon Tax,” FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.feministlawprof
essors.com/2016/11/interview-laura-strausfeld-new-york-attorney-challenging-tampon-tax/
[https://perma.cc/8ZNB-423X] (describing involvement of attorneys at Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP).
113. Complaint at 1–3, 15, Seibert v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., No. 151800/
2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2016) (seeking an end to the sales tax on menstrual hygiene
products in New York and requesting tax refunds on behalf of all who had made purchases
in the state in the prior three years via class action lawsuit). The commencement of the legal
action immediately attracted press attention. See, e.g., Emma Whitford, NY Women File
Class Action Lawsuit to End the Tampon Tax, GOTHAMIST (Mar. 3, 2016, 12:53 PM), http://
gothamist.com/2016/03/03/tampon_tax_lawsuit.php [https://perma.cc/E3LR-NHKR].
114. Complaint, supra note 113, at 1–2.
115. Id. at 9, 15.
116. Id. at 13.
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tampon tax failed intermediate scrutiny, and alternatively, that
the tampon tax could not satisfy rational-basis review. 117 The complaint noted that under the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance’s approach, products “used to stop the flow of
blood from nonfeminine parts of the body are ‘medical supplies,’
while tampons and pads, used to stop the flow of blood from the
uterus, are not.” 118 It vividly compared New York’s taxation of
menstrual hygiene products with the state’s failure to tax
“Rogaine, dandruff shampoo, foot powder, chapstick, and so many
other less medically necessary products also used by men.” 119 However, the complaint (as is appropriate for an initial pleading) did
not flesh out the reasoning behind its arguments that the tampon
tax was discriminatory, other than to say that “a tax on feminine
hygiene products is on its face a tax on women, and . . . results in
the disparate treatment of women.” 120
Less than three months after the suit was filed, New York repealed its tax on menstrual hygiene products. 121 Instead of reclassifying menstrual hygiene products as “medical products,” New
York added a stand-alone exemption. 122 In part because the plaintiffs’ injunctive claims became moot, they agreed to a voluntary
dismissal of their case. 123 When asked why the plaintiffs did not
pursue their claim for refunds, restitution, attorneys’ fees and
costs, Strausfeld noted that, “Pursuing a case of this sort, on a contingency fee basis and with an uncertain result, is expensive for
the attorneys.” 124 The plaintiffs did, however, retain the option to
renew those claims. 125 Thus, it seems that the plaintiffs’ primary
goals were to draw attention to the cause and to effectuate legal
117. Id. at 8. The plaintiffs parsed the state regulations exempting from taxation “medical supplies,” defined as “supplies used in the cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of
illnesses or diseases,” and regulations’ examples of medical supplies as “bandages, gauze,
and dressings.” Id. at 5 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 528.4(g) (2018)).
118. Id. at 9 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 528.4(g) (2018)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 13.
121. See Associated Press, New York Legislature Cuts Taxes on Tampons and Other Feminine Hygiene Products, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/
nyregion/new-york-legislature-cuts-taxes-on-feminine-hygiene-products.html [https://per
ma.cc/LBC5-5T3F]; Anna North, A Welcome End to New York’s ‘Tampon Tax,’ N.Y. TIMES:
TAKING NOTE (May 26, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/awelcome-end-to-new-yorks-tampon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/5JPV-Z63A].
122. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3-a) (McKinney 2017).
123. See Crawford, supra note 112.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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change, rather than to receive compensation. They were able to
claim victory once New York repealed its tax. 126
C. Florida: Legislative Change and Dismissal
Likely inspired by the result in New York, less than two months
after the New York legislature voted to repeal the state’s tampon
tax, a Florida attorney filed a class action in Wendell v. Florida
Department of Revenue on behalf of a plaintiff who sought to challenge Florida’s taxation of menstrual hygiene products. 127 As in the
New York suit, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, a tax refund,
and a declaration that the Florida statute violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions. 128
And just as the New York plaintiffs had pointed out the oddity of
New York’s classifications, the plaintiff here focused on the failure
of Florida to include menstrual hygiene products in the state’s taxexempt category of related “common household remedies recommended and generally sold for internal or external use in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of illness or disease in human
beings.” 129 The complaint specifically noted that unisex blood absorption-related products like “band-aids, bandages, gauze, and
adhesive tape” were tax-exempt under Florida law, as were common household remedies “also used by men, such as epsom salts,
athlete’s foot treatment, hair regrowth treatment, and petroleum
jelly.” 130

126. See, e.g., Annamarya Scaccia, New York Is Finally Pulling the Plug on Its Tampon
Tax, VICE: BROADLY (Apr. 13, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/d7an
8v/new-york-is-finally-pulling-the-plug-on-its-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/8S4K-8GYW]
(quoting New York attorney Zoe Salzman of Emery Celli Brinckerhof & Abady as saying
that the lawsuit “motivated” the New York state’s legislative repeal).
127. Complaint at 2, Wendell v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 2016-CA-001526 (Fla. Leon
County Ct. 2016).
128. Id. at 2, 19.
129. Id. at 15 (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.08(2)(a) (2018)).
130. Id. at 2 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12A-1.020(5) (2018)). When asked about
menstrual hygiene products related to “treatment or prevention of illness or disease in human beings,” the plaintiff’s attorney explained that the products “play an essential role in
reducing and preventing the spread of blood borne illnesses,” and that “[s]imply put, it’s a
public health safety issue, the costs of which are solely borne by women. These products are
not luxuries—women can’t just stay home until they stop bleeding.” Bridget Crawford, Interview with Dana Brooks Cooper, Florida Attorney Challenging the “Tampon Tax,”
FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (July 28, 2016), https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2016/07/
interview-dana-brooks-cooper-florida-attorney-challenging-tampon-tax-2/ [https://perma.cc
/2TZ2-STF6].
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On May 26, 2017, almost ten months after the filing of the Florida class action (and one year after New York’s repeal), the Florida
legislature repealed its tampon tax and Governor Rick Scott signed
the bill into law. 131 In February 2018, the Florida class action was
dismissed. 132 Far from being an obstacle to reform (as one legislative aide had warned), 133 the class action may have spurred the
state legislature to act.
Before either New York or Florida repealed its sales tax on menstrual hygiene products, attorneys filed separate class actions lawsuits in California 134 and Ohio. 135 The plaintiffs in both cases
sought declaratory judgments that each state’s respective sales tax
on menstrual hygiene products was unconstitutional, injunctive
relief from enforcement, and restitution for taxes previously
paid. 136 Although it does not appear that the attorneys in any of
the four class action cases consulted each other, it is clear that they
were aware of the other suits, as the complaints in all four jurisdictions included substantially similar language. 137
131. H.R. 7109, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017); see also Catherine Pearson, Florida
Just Became the Latest State to Abolish the ‘Tampon Tax,’ HUFFPOST (May 26, 2017, 11:14
AM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/florida-just-became-the-latest-state-to-abo
lish-the-tampon-tax_us_59282d4de4b0df34c35b77cf [https://perma.cc/6RML-AT3H].
132. See Notice of Stipulated Dismissal, Wendell v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, No. 2016-CA001526 (Fla. Leon County Ct. 2018); Notice of Dismissal, Wendell v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue,
No. 2016-CA-001526 (Fla. Leon County Ct. 2018) (dismissed with prejudice).
133. See Jeff Burlew, Sen. Simpson Seeks Repeal of ‘Tampon Tax,’ TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT (Jul. 13, 2016, 5:13 PM ET), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2016/07/
13/sen-simpson-seeks-repeal-tampon-tax/87049694/ [https://perma.cc/54YK-HJVX] (quoting Rachel Perrin Rogers, Republican Senator Simpson’s chief legislative assistant, as saying that Senator Simpson had been previously unaware of the tampon tax and that “[i]n my
experience as a committee analyst and legislative assistant, there have been many situations in which what very easily could have been a simple legislative fix became difficult as
a result of ongoing litigation”). Ms. Rogers’ predictions do not appear to have been borne out
in this case.
134. Complaint at 1, 3, DiSimone v. Cal. Dep’t of Tax and Fee Admin., 2018 Cal. Super.
LEXIS 1814 (Jan. 29, 2018) (No. 16CV293099); see also Jennifer Wadsworth, Fight Over
Absurd ‘Tampon Tax’ Continues in California Court, SAN JOSE INSIDE (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://www.sanjoseinside.com/2016/09/20/fight-over-absurd-tampon-tax-continues-in-calif
ornia-court [https://perma.cc/5TMB-HEG5].
135. See Class Action Complaint, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 11,
2016).
136. Complaint, supra note 127, at 15; Class Action Complaint, supra note 135, at 13.
137. Compare, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 2016-00197JD (Ohio Ct.
of Cl. Mar. 14, 2016) (labeling one cause of action “Inapplicable Tax and Arbitrary, Capricious, Legally Deficient Determination Against All Defendants”), with Complaint, supra
note 113, at 12 (using identical heading “Inapplicable Tax and Arbitrary, Capricious, Legally Deficient Determination Against All Defendants”). The defendants in the Ohio case
cited the similarities between the complaints in the Ohio and New York cases in their motion to Dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss of Defendant States of Ohio, Ohio Department of
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D. California: Dismissal and Dicta
DiSimone v. California resembled the New York and Florida
cases in that it sought injunctive relief, refund of prior taxes paid,
and attorneys’ fees and costs. 138 As in Seibert and Wendell, the complaint alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution and state constitution. 139 It asserted
that the California tax on menstrual hygiene products is “not only
discriminatory in intent and disparate in impact, it is arbitrary,
capricious, and irrational. This sales tax is not substantially related to the advancement of any important government interest.” 140 In a separate filing in DiSimone, a doctor emphasized that
California imposes sales tax on menstrual hygiene products while
simultaneously exempting Viagra as a medical necessity. 141
Initially, the plaintiffs sued the state of California, the governor,
and, individually and in a representative capacity, the director of
the California State Board of Equalization, the entity responsible
for administering the state’s tax system. 142 The court dismissed, as
improper parties, the governor and the director of the Board of
Equalization. 143 The court permitted the plaintiff to substitute the
California Department of Tax and Fee Administration in lieu of the
Board of Equalization. 144 The parties then cross-moved for summary judgment. 145 The court granted the defendant’s motion on
Taxation, Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio & Joseph W. Testa Individually at 1
n.1, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. June 16, 2016).
138. See Complaint, supra note 134, at 15.
139. Id. at 13.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Declaration of Felice L. Gersh, M.D. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-552458). Unlike the
New York or Florida complaints, the California complaint included claims of an alleged violations of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
violation of her federal civil rights. Complaint, supra note 134, at 3. However, this article
focuses on the complaint’s equal protection argument.
142. Complaint, supra note 134, at 1; see About BOE, CAL. STATE BD. EQUALIZATION,
https://www.boe.ca.gov/info/about.htm [https://perma.cc/D97G-R4XA] (last visited Dec. 1,
2018) (stating that the Board of Equalization’s mission is “to serve the public through fair,
effective, and efficient tax administration”).
143. Orders Sustaining Demurrers with Leave to Amend & Setting Case Management
Conference at 1, 10, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-552458).
144. Order Granting Substitution of Defendant, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814
(No. CGC-16-552458).
145. California Department of Tax & Fee Administration’s Notice of Motion & Motion
for Summary Judgment at 1–2, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16552458); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion & Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication at 1–2, DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-
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procedural grounds. 146 The court reasoned that the proper taxpayers to seek a refund were the retailers who had paid the tax to the
State of California, and that individual retail consumers could seek
relief directly from the state only in limited circumstances that
were not available in this case. 147
Having dismissed the case on grounds that the wrong plaintiffs
had sued, the court could have stopped there. Instead, the court
subsequently explained in dicta why it viewed California’s tampon
tax as constitutional. 148 In so doing, the court did not explore the
argument—developed more fully below—that the tampon tax is so
closely tied to women’s biology that it can be viewed as a facially
sex-based classification. 149 Instead, it analyzed the tax only
through a disparate impact lens, concluding that there was insufficient evidence of disparate impact and no evidence of discriminatory intent. 150 As discussed below, this analysis is incomplete. 151
The California court failed to engage the facial classification argument (which the pleadings had not made explicitly), oversimplified
the facial neutrality argument (also not explicit in the pleadings),
and was too conclusory in accepting that California has a rational
basis for excluding menstrual hygiene products from the list of exempted necessities. We explore those issues in greater depth in
Part IV.
E. Ohio: Administrative Appeal and Judicial Inactivity
In March 2016, four plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit, arguing that the Ohio state sales tax on menstrual hygiene products
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the state and federal constitutions. 152 In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought to have menstrual hygiene products brought within the definition of tax-free
“drugs,” defined in the state sales tax law as including a “substance
552458).
146. Order Granting Motion of California Department of Tax & Fee Administration for
Summary Judgment & Denying Motion of Plaints for Summary Judgment at 3–4,
DiSimone, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1814 (No. CGC-16-552455).
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id. at 4–9.
149. See id; see also infra Part IV.A.
150. Order Granting Motion, supra note 146, at 6–7 (“[W]e do not know if men or women
generally bear a heavier tax burden as a result of all the various products which are, and
are not, exempt.”).
151. See infra Part IV.
152. Class Action Complaint, supra note 137, at 1–2.
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that is intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body.” 153 Like their counterparts in New York, Florida, and California, the Ohio plaintiffs also sought a refund for sales tax paid in
the past and attorneys’ fees and costs. 154
The defendants, the Ohio Department of Taxation and Joseph
Testa, individually and as Tax Commissioner of Ohio, moved to
dismiss the case on the grounds that the Ohio statute required the
plaintiffs first to file a claim for a sales tax refund with the Ohio
State Tax Commissioner, which they had not done. 155 Before the
court ruled on the motion, the defendants filed either to dismiss
the case or alternatively, to stay the proceedings until the plaintiffs
concluded their administrative appeals. 156 The court granted the
stay while the plaintiffs requested a refund from the Ohio Board of
Tax Appeals. 157
The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals denied the taxpayers’ application
to the Ohio Tax Commissioner for a refund of sales tax paid on
menstrual hygiene products. 158 The taxpayers have filed a notice
of appeal to the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals; therefore,
the Court of Common Pleas case is currently marked as “inactive,”
pending that appeal. 159 The basis for the appeal is three-fold: first,
the plaintiff’s claim that the Ohio sales tax on menstrual hygiene
products violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and
state constitutions; second, that the classification of tampons as
medical devices by the federal Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) preempts any other classification for state law purposes;
153. Class Action Amended Complaint at 1–2, 4, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio
C.P. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01 (2016)). And like their California
counterparts, the Ohio plaintiffs sought a declaration that the tampon tax violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and a finding of a § 1983 violation of federal civil
rights. See id. at 12; Complaint, supra note 134, at 3.
154. Class Action Amended Complaint, supra note 153, at 13; see supra Part II.E.
155. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 137, at 2–6.
156. Second Motion to Dismiss & Motion to Stay of Defendants State of Ohio, Ohio Department of Taxation & Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio at 1–2, Rowitz v. Ohio,
No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. Jan. 13, 2017).
157. Entry Granting Stay, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio. C.P. Nov. 22, 2017).
158. Decision and Order, Rowitz v. Testa, Nos. 2017-250, 2017-251, 2017-252, 2017-253
(Ohio B.T.A. Feb. 20, 2018); Defendants State of Ohio, Ohio Department of Taxation & Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio’s Notice of BTA Decision & Subsequent Appeal,
Exhibit A, Rowitz v. Ohio, No. 16CV003518 (Ohio C.P. Mar. 19, 2018).
159. Notice of Appeal Pursuant to Revised Code Section 5717.04, Rowitz v. Testa, No.
18-AP-000191 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2018); see Case Information Online, FRANKLIN
COUNTY CLERK COURTS, https://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us/CaseInformationOnline/name
Search [https://perma.cc/6B4V-VHDS] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (search “Rowitz”) (listing
case number 16-CV-003518 as inactive).
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and, third, that menstrual hygiene products should be classified
for state law as “drugs,” “durable medical equipment,” or “prosthetic devices,” and thus exempt from taxation. 160
The preemption argument is weak, as there is no reason to think
that an FDA definition would control for purposes of state sales tax
law, which is in the exclusive domain of the taxing state. 161 And
the attempt to shoehorn menstrual hygiene products into the definition of drugs, durable medical equipment, or prosthetic devices
strains statutory interpretation beyond plain meaning (although
the relevant definition of “drugs” is so broad that it could conceivably include menstrual hygiene products). 162 The equal protection
argument, however, is strong and it is there that we now turn.
III. RELEVANT EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has long recognized sex as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes, such that facially sex-based
governmental distinctions receive heightened review. 163 Although
sex-based classifications do not trigger strict scrutiny, they do trigger intermediate scrutiny, which means that the classifications

160. Notice of Appeal, supra note 159 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(FFF),
(HHH), (JJJ) (2007 & Supp. 2018)).
161. For a sample of relevant scholarship on federalism, see, for example, Heather K.
Gerkin, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85 (2014); Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional
Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).
162. For a sample of relevant scholarship on statutory interpretation, see, for example,
RONALD B. BROWN & SHARON J. BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 1–3 (2002) (explaining the importance of statutory interpretation);
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079
(2017); William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 539 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990); Abbe Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); Abbe R. Gluck &
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—an Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pts. 1 & 2), 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013),
66 STAN L. REV. 725 (2014); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive
Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV 1189 (2006).
163. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that “classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,” i.e., pass intermediate scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (stating that classifications based on sex should “be subjected to close judicial scrutiny”).
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must be substantially related to an important governmental purpose. 164 In United States v. Virginia, 165 the Supreme Court emphasized the stringent nature of this review, describing it as “skeptical
scrutiny” that requires an “exceedingly persuasive justification” to
be satisfied. 166
In comparison to facial sex-based classifications, it is harder to
challenge facially neutral governmental distinctions that have a
disparate impact as to sex. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 167 a showing of disparate
impact as to gender is not itself sufficient to trigger intermediate
scrutiny. A plaintiff must also prove discriminatory intent. 168
Feeney involved a challenge to Massachusetts’ veteran preference statute, with the plaintiffs claiming it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 169 Under the statute, all veterans who qualified for state civil service positions had
to be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. 170 This had a hugely disparate impact on women; at the time
the Feeney litigation began in 1975, veterans comprised over 25%
of the Massachusetts population, and over 98% of the veterans
were male. 171
Still, the Court ruled that there was no equal protection violation, because the challengers could not show that “a gender-based
discriminatory purpose ha[d], at least in some measure, shaped the
Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.” 172 The Court explained that “the State intended nothing more than to prefer ‘veterans’” and that the “intent to exclude women from significant public jobs was not at work in this law.” 173 The Court acknowledged
that the Massachusetts legislature likely was aware that most veterans were men, but explained that this was not enough: to win,

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Id. at 531 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogen, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 261–63 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7 (1976)).
Id. at 270.
Id. at 276, 281.
Id. at 277.
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the plaintiffs needed to show that the legislature “selected or reaffirmed [this] particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” women. 174
The question of whether a law draws a facial classification based
on sex, therefore, is critical. Often, the answer is obvious: the statutory text itself explicitly references sex or gender. 175 Sometimes,
however, it is a closer call whether a classification is facially sexbased. That was the case in Geduldig v. Aiello. 176
Geduldig involved state and federal equal protection challenges
to California’s disability insurance system, which was funded by
automatic paycheck deductions and insured “against the risk of
disability stemming from a substantial number of ‘mental or physical illness[es] and mental or physical injur[ies].’” 177 The statute
did not cover disabilities lasting fewer than eight days, and the
benefits did not extend beyond twenty-six weeks. 178 Most disabilities were covered, but the system excluded disabilities resulting
from alcoholism, drug addiction, sexual psychopathy, and normal
pregnancies, although disabilities resulting from abnormal pregnancy complications (such as ectopic pregnancies) were covered. 179
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that, in excluding coverage for disabilities from typical pregnancies, the system was engaging in invidious sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. 180 The Court explained in a footnote:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities. While it
is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification . . . . Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics . . . . The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant

174. Id. at 279.
175. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 59–61 (2001)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a statute that imposed different requirements for a
child’s acquisition of citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent was the mother or
father).
176. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
177. Id. at 487–88.
178. Id. at 488.
179. Id. at 489, 493.
180. Id. at 494.
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women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both
sexes. 181

Many commentators and legislators immediately disagreed with
Geduldig. 182 Four years after Geduldig was decided, Congress
amended Title VII to clarify that its prohibition of discrimination
based on sex included pregnancy discrimination. 183 But, of course,
Congress could not amend the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause, and so Geduldig technically remains
applicable to constitutional claims even though it is irrelevant to
employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII.
More recently, some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court has, at least implicitly, moved beyond Geduldig’s reasoning. Neil and Reva Siegel, for example, point to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 184 where the Court recognized the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”) as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause on grounds that the FMLA entitled both male and female employees to take leaves in connection
with the arrival of a new baby, and would thus arguably prevent
employers from viewing childcare solely as women’s work. 185 The
Hibbs Court thus acknowledged, Siegel and Siegel argue, that “unconstitutional sex stereotyping has shaped laws governing pregnant women as well as new mothers.” 186 They conclude that
“[w]here the Court was once inclined to view the regulation of pregnant women as presumptively benign, the Court is now more quick

181. Id. at 496–97 n.20.
182. David L. Kirp & Dorothy Robyn, Pregnancy, Justice, and the Justices, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 947, 948, 951, 954 (1979); see, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello:
Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441,
442–43, 482 (1975).
183. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) states that:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.
184. 538 U.S. 721, 722 (2003).
185. See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From
Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095, 1106 (2009).
186. Id. at 1107.
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to recognize constitutional concerns at stake.” 187 This evolution,
they suggest, brings Geduldig’s reasoning into question.
Moving beyond the pregnancy context, Holning Lau and Hillary
Li have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges, 188 which struck down same-sex marriage bans, also casts
doubt on Geduldig’s approach. 189 Lau and Li point out that although Geduldig “concluded that there was no sex discrimination
because not all women are, or will ever be, pregnant . . . Obergefell
was much less concerned about the fact that some gays and lesbians are neither interested nor ever will be interested in getting
married.” 190 In other words, the Obergefell Court focused less on
whether every gay person was specifically and tangibly affected by
the same-sex marriage bans, and instead emphasized the aggregate and symbolic effect of the ban. We draw on these arguments,
along with others, in explaining below why Geduldig should not
foreclose viewing the tampon tax as unconstitutionally sex-based.
IV. WHY THE TAMPON TAX IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
SEX-BASED TAX
The tampon tax straddles the divide between the “facial classification” and “facial neutrality” scenarios. The sales tax systems in
the thirty-five states that impose the tampon tax do not explicitly
mention women when they classify menstrual hygiene products as
“taxable” and other necessities as “exempt.” 191 However, in the
same way that comparatively unfavorable tax treatment of yarmulkes would be viewed as a tax on Jews (even if the word “Jew”
did not appear in the legislation), so too should a tax on menstrual
hygiene products—in the context of a tax system that exempts
other “necessities”—be understood as a tax on women. Indeed, as
we discuss further below, the most appropriate analysis of the tampon tax is as a facial sex-based classification. Moreover, the facial

187. Id. at 1113.
188. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
189. See Holning Lau & Hillary Li, American Equal Protection and Global Convergence,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1261–63 (2017) (noting that the Obergefell Court focused on the
discriminatory impact of same-sex marriage bans).
190. Id. at 1263.
191. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-04(26)(d)(2) (2018) (providing sales tax exemption for “incontinent pad and pants” used by “a person with bladder dysfunction”). Menstrual hygiene products are subject to taxation because they are not specifically exempt. See
id. § 57-39.2-04.
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neutrality framework also supports the argument that the tampon
tax is unconstitutional. As applied to the tampon tax, there is an
important synergy between the facial classification and facial neutrality frameworks.
A. The Facial Classification Model
Geduldig initially poses a challenge to the argument that the
tampon tax should be viewed as a facial sex-based classification.
After all, Geduldig held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related
conditions from disability coverage did not amount to facial discrimination against women. 192 If pregnancy (and its associated disabilities) does not count as a proxy for female sex, why should menstruation (and its associated products)? Litigators challenging the
tampon tax as unconstitutional must have a satisfactory answer to
that question.
Without endorsing Geduldig’s holding, we contend that there
are numerous reasons why pregnancy is distinguishable from the
tampon tax. First, it is important to recognize that Geduldig predated the fully fleshed-out modern approach to sex discrimination
cases, where facial classifications immediately trigger intermediate scrutiny. Geduldig was decided in 1974, two years before the
Supreme Court decided Craig v. Boren, which recognized intermediate scrutiny as the test for sex-based classifications. 193 Of course,
even as of 1974, the Supreme Court had suggested that certain differential treatment based on sex should trigger heightened review. 194 But the lack of clarity on what heightened review should
involve, and how stringent it should be, arguably muddied the
Geduldig Court’s analysis. The majority opinion was short, and did
not fully grapple with the question of whether disfavorable treatment of pregnancy amounted to disfavorable treatment of women.
Rather, the Court conclusorily relied on an oddly drawn distinction

192. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494, 497 (1974).
193. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny as
standard for evaluating sex-based statutory classifications). Tellingly, at the time Geduldig
was decided, some commentators interpreted it as applying only rational basis review to
sex-based classifications. See, e.g., Lois B. Gordon, Pre-Marriage Name Change, Resumption, and Reregistration Statutes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1508, 1512 n.13 (1974).
194. The Geduldig Court acknowledged this, and deemed “this case . . . a far cry from
cases like Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, involving discrimination based upon
gender as such.” Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (citations omitted).
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between “pregnant women” and “nonpregnant persons” 195—a distinction that, according to Kenji Yoshino, has “elicited disbelieving
and pained laughter from generations of my Constitutional Law
students.” 196 Tellingly, the Geduldig majority itself—in stating
that even “the most cursory analysis” 197 supported its conclusion—
implicitly admitted that it was not doing much more than that.
Second, as scholars like Reva Siegel, Neil Siegel, Holning Lau,
and Hillary Li have observed, various aspects of more recent Supreme Court decisions have called Geduldig’s reasoning into question. As discussed above, these scholars show how, in both the
pregnancy and the same-sex marriage contexts, the Court has
moved away from the formalism that characterized Geduldig. 198
Instead, the Court has focused on the underlying stereotyping and
aggregate effect of the laws being challenged. 199 This shift further
supports the argument that Geduldig’s formalism should not prevent courts from viewing a tax on menstrual hygiene products as a
functional tax on women.
Third, even under Geduldig’s own cursory reasoning, menstruation (and its related products) should still fare better than pregnancy (and its related disabilities). Under the Geduldig Court’s approach, the California program did not discriminate against
women writ large, because “pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics,” with most women
falling, at any given time, into the category of “nonpregnant persons.” 200 Today, pregnancy in the United States is even less frequent than it was at the time of Geduldig; in 2017, the United
States fertility rate fell to a record low of 60.2 births per 1000
women of childbearing age, down 3% from 2016. 201 The total fertility rate is down to 1.84 births per woman. 202 Thus, now more than
ever, women spend the vast majority of their lives as “nonpregnant
persons.”

195. Id. at 496–97 n.20
196. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 782 (2011).
197. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20.
198. See supra notes 184–90 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 184–90 and accompanying text.
200. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97 n.20.
201. Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Fertility Rate Fell to a Record Low, for a Second Straight
Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/fertility-rate-de
cline-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/VB8V-ZP22].
202. Claire Cain Miller, The U.S. Fertility Rate Is Down, Yet More Women Are Mothers,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-us-fertility-ra
te-is-down-yet-more-women-are-mothers.html [https://perma.cc/7NH3-D4ZG].
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By contrast, menstruation is a regular occurrence in most
women’s lives from, on average, the ages of thirteen to fifty-one. 203
According to a recent study by the Association of Reproductive
Health Professionals, women currently have an estimated 450 periods during their lifetime. 204 One recent analysis concluded that
the average woman spends roughly 2280 days (6.25 years) menstruating. 205 Therefore, Geduldig’s approach of dividing women
into those who were affected and those who were not (i.e., “pregnant women” versus “nonpregnant persons”) makes even less
sense in the context of menstruation. Unlike pregnancy, menstruation is a consistent, unavoidable aspect of most women’s lives for
an average of four decades. Menstruation is thus an even stronger
proxy for female sex than is pregnancy.
Fourth, the Geduldig Court gave two policy justifications for
California’s exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its disability insurance program, neither of which are applicable to the
tampon tax. 206 The Court suggested that the cost of covering all
instances of temporary disability “accompanying normal pregnancy and delivery” would be so large as to require restructuring
California’s entire program. 207 By contrast, the tampon tax is a relatively small feature of state sales taxation systems; adding menstrual hygiene products to the already-existing lists of exempted
products is highly unlikely to bankrupt state treasuries. 208
203. See Kane, supra note 85.
204. See supra note 86–88 and accompanying text (estimating the time that the average
woman spends menstruating over the course of her lifetime).
205. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
206. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 493–94 (1974).
207. Id. at 493. The Geduldig Court stated that even if California were overstating the
case that it would be “impossible” to maintain the program if it covered pregnancies, the
program would need to change one or more significant variables, such as “the benefit level
deemed appropriate to compensate employee disability, the risks selected to be insured under the program, and the contribution rate chosen to maintain the solvency of the program
and at the same time to permit low-income employees to participate with minimal personal
sacrifice.” Id. at 493–94. The Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause did not require “such policies to be sacrificed or compromised.” Id. at 494.
208. By way of illustration, the California state budget for 2018 to 2019 is greater than
$201 billion. Welcome to 2018–19 State Budget, CAL. BUDGET, http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/
budget/2018-19EN/ [https://perma.cc/9PQ4-A4FL] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also
EDMUND G. BROWN JR., CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET 2018–2019, at 18–20, http://www.ebud
get.ca.gov/2018-19/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X24D-4ETQ]. According to one recent estimate, the State of California collects approximately $20 million in taxes associated with the sale of menstrual hygiene products. Nicole
Kaeding, Tampon Taxes: Do Feminine Hygiene Products Deserve a Sales Tax Exemption?,
TAX FOUND. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/tampon-taxes-sales-tax/ [https://perm
acc/D57T-MKV5]. Thus, tampon tax revenue in California represents less than 0.011% of
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Geduldig also emphasized the lack of evidence that the current
version of the disability program was benefitting men more than
women, noting that even with the pregnancy exclusion, women
were still “contribut[ing] about 28 percent of the total disability insurance fund and receiv[ing] back about 38 percent of the fund in
benefits.” 209 This, too, contrasts with the tampon tax situation currently occurring in many states, where male-specific items like
spermicidal condoms are exempted from taxation, even while menstrual hygiene products are not. 210
Finally, we note that Geduldig itself did not say that pregnancyrelated classifications never amounted to sex-based classifications;
it merely said that not “every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification.” 211 If Geduldig left the door
open for even some legislative classifications concerning pregnancy
to qualify as sex-based classifications, the door should be equally
(if not more) open for legislative classifications concerning menstruation to qualify.
For all of these reasons, it is inaccurate to interpret Geduldig as
foreclosing the tampon tax’s treatment as a sex-based classification. Indeed, the sex-based classification model is the most apt
framework here. Just as the exclusion of yarmulkes from a “religious clothing” tax exemption would be a tax on Jews, the exclusion
of menstrual hygiene products from the various necessity-based
tax exemptions constitutes a tax on women.
B. The Facial Neutrality Model
Although the facial classification model does most of the work,
the facial neutrality model also contributes to the argument that
the tampon tax should trigger intermediate scrutiny. Under the
facial neutrality model, as discussed above, both disparate impact
and discriminatory intent must be shown to move from rational
basis into intermediate scrutiny. 212 Here, the disparate impact
demonstration is straightforward, since there is no question that

the state’s budget.
209. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 499 n.21 (quoting the lower court’s decision in Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 782, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1973)).
210. See supra Part I.B.
211. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (emphasis added).
212. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
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menstrual hygiene products are used primarily or exclusively by
women. 213
That men sometimes purchase these products for women does
not change the analysis. As the Federal Circuit recently explained
in Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 214 which involved a challenge to a tariff that imposed a higher duty rate on men’s leather
gloves than other gloves:
It may be, as the Court of International Trade suggested, that the tariff does not discriminate between male and female purchasers of
gloves because women buy men’s gloves for men and men buy women’s
gloves for women. But this comparison entirely misses the point. The
claimed discrimination is based on the sex of the glove users, not the
sex of the glove purchasers . . . . Under the theory of purchaser equality, generally imposing a higher tax on vehicles purchased for female
users would raise no constitutional questions if both men and women
equally purchased the vehicles in question. Any such theory is untenable. 215

The bigger challenge under the facial neutrality model is showing discriminatory intent. We are not aware of any “smoking gun”
evidence that the tampon tax resulted from a conscious, intentional desire to harm women. 216 However, it is logical to infer that
various states’ tax treatment of menstrual hygiene products as
nonnecessities is the result of a combination of indifference, lack of
understanding, and discomfort with discussions about or consideration of women’s biological processes. 217 Indeed, when a popular
YouTube personality asked then-President Barack Obama about
the tampon tax, he responded: “I have to tell you, I have no idea

213. For potential uses of tampons by men, see Neil Hill, 10 Reasons Why Men Should
Carry a Tampon, GOOD MEN PROJECT (May 28, 2018), https://goodmenproject.com/fea
tured-content/nhe-10-reasons-why-men-should-carry-a-tampon
[https://perma.cc/R5YMBV95] (listing “[p]lugging a puncture wound,” “[s]tarting a fire,” and making “[b]lister plaster” among reasons for a man to carry a tampon; having a tampon on hand for a woman who
may need one is not among the listed reasons for a man to have tampons on hand).
214. 594 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 830 (2010).
215. Id. at 1355.
216. E.g., Telephone Interview with Arthur R. Rosen, Partner, McDermott, Will & Emery (July 6, 2016) (“In my heart of hearts, I do not believe that the tax administrators in
New York had any discriminatory intent in mind. I believe that there was an effort to implement a very technical definition of the statutory exemption and that is the reason we
have the situation with the feminine hygiene products being subject to tax.”); Crawford,
supra note 130 (hypothesizing that the Florida legislation’s then-failure to exempt menstrual hygiene products from sales tax did not result from legislators’ specific goal to harm
women; rather “they simply did not give it sufficient thought”).
217. See Hartman, supra note 87, at 349–50 (arguing that the tampon tax is connected
to “misunderstandings about women’s biology”).
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why states would tax these as luxury items. I suspect it’s because
men were making the laws when those taxes were passed.” 218
Various menstrual taboos—and notions of menstruation as unclean and very private—date back millennia, across numerous cultures. 219 Even today in the United States, euphemisms are frequently used for menstrual periods 220 and advertisements for
menstrual hygiene products typically demonstrate absorbency using blue liquid rather than a red substance that realistically illustrates menstrual blood. 221 The invisibility of menstruation in our

218. Reflect, Ingrid Nilsen Interviews Obama, YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2016), https://
youtu.be/K2Oaa WjB6S8 [https://perma.cc/4CE4-EKSA]; see also Prachi Gupta, Obama:
Tampon Tax Probably Exists Because Only Dudes Were Making Laws, COSMOPOLITAN (Jan.
15, 2016), http:// www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a52262/president-obama-respondstotampon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/7EAK-KARY]; Maya Rhoden, President Obama Doesn’t Understand the ‘Tampon Tax’ Either, TIME (Jan. 15, 2016), http://time.com/4183108/obamatampon-tax-san itary/ [https://perma.cc/L8SR-B9RR]; Sade Strehlke, Watch YouTube Star
Ingrid Nilsen School President Obama on the “Tampon Tax,” TEEN VOGUE (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/ingrid-nilsen-obama-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/Y8RQFRR9].
219. E.g., WEISS-WOLF, supra note 91, at 5–11 (describing ancient and contemporary religious and cultural “distrust, even disgust for women’s monthly blood”); see also Kay Standing & Sara L. Parker, Girls and Women’s Rights to Menstrual Health in Nepal, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON WOMEN’S ISSUES AND RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 156,
157–61 (Nazmunnessa Mahtab et al. eds., 2017); Nikita Arora, Menstruation in India: Ideology, Politics, and Capitalism, 23 ASIAN J. WOMEN’S STUD. 528 (2017); Verity Bowman,
Woman in Nepal Dies After Being Exiled to Outdoor Hut During Her Period, GUARDIAN (Jan.
12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jan/12/woman-nepal-dies
-exiled-outdoor-hut-period-menstruation [https://perma.cc/YR65-BDNP] (describing certain
practices in parts of Nepal); Kena Holkar, How the Taboo Around Menstruation Is Rooted
in Religion and Culture, YOUTH KI AWAAZ (May 18, 2018), https://www.youthkiawaaz.com/
2018/05/why-do-we-need-to-break-the-silence-around-menstrual-taboo [https://perma.cc/E
K H4-62NW] (describing certain practices in parts of India). On the cultural construction of
menstruating women as weak, unworthy and inferior to men, see Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 506, 508–12 (citing first-century Irish epic poetry, Shakespeare, contemporary news and current events to demonstrate radical misunderstandings of menstruation).
220. See, e.g., Top Euphemisms for “Period” by Language, CLUE (Mar. 10, 2016), https://
helloclue.com/articles/culture/top-euphemisms-for-period-by-language [https://perma.cc/ZG
8M-Z57M]; see also Roisin O’Connor, Menstruation Study Finds Over 5,000 Slang Terms for
‘Period,’ INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/heal
th-and-families/menstruation-study-finds-over-5000-slang-terms-for-period-a6905021.
html [https://perma.cc/6TPC-XZ8C] (reporting, in connection with global survey of more
than 90,000 people, that the top ten English-language euphemisms for menstruation are
“[c]rimson wave,” “[m]other nature,” “[l]ady time,” “[a]unt flow,” “[t]ime of the month,” “[o]n
the rag,” “[s]hark week,” “[r]ed tide,” “[c]ode red,” “[m]onthly friend,” “[h]aving the painters
in,” “[b]loody [m]ary,” and “[b]lob” and noting that residents of France and China are among
those most likely to speak about menstruation in slang terms, using euphemisms at a rate
of 91%).
221. See Ann Bartow, Red Dot in Sanitary Napkin Advertisement Makes Her Story!,
FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (July 6, 2011), https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/07/
red-dot-sanitary-napkin-advertisement-makes-herstory [https://perma.cc/KK97-5KYL] (describing first use in advertising of menstrual hygiene product showing a red mark); Bridget
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society has contributed, we believe, to the failure to affirmatively
include menstrual hygiene products in the various tax exemptions
for necessities. In other words, the failure to mention menstrual
hygiene products on the list of exempted necessities is a foreseeable result of the desire not to see, talk, or think about menstruation
at all. 222 And without the discussion and enumeration of menstrual
hygiene products, it is hard for them to be singled out for inclusion
on the tax-exempt list. Instead, they remain in the default category
of taxable items.
The tampon tax thus stands in contrast to other differential taxation, such as the Totes-Isotoner case involving a higher tariff on
men’s leather gloves. 223 There, the Federal Circuit—after finding
that this higher tariff had a disparate impact on men—concluded
that there was still no equal protection violation because there was
no indication of discriminatory intent. 224 The court reasoned that
although “[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews . . . .
[m]en’s gloves are hardly an irrational object of disfavor, and a tax
on them creates no compelling inference that Congress intended to
discriminate against men.” 225
Menstruation and its related products, however, have long been
an irrational object of disfavor. 226 Moreover, menstrual hygiene
products are much more closely associated with women than are
leather gloves with men, making it easier to infer some level of discriminatory intent. (Indeed, these products are often referred to as
“feminine hygiene products.”) The tampon tax is thus much more
analogous to a yarmulke tax than to a tax on men’s leather gloves.

Crawford, Women Don’t Bleed Blue (Even Yalies and Members of the Social Register),
FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2017/10/
women-dont-bleed-blue-even-yalies-and-members-of-the-social-register [https://perma.cc/4
VTK-SHAX] (detailing controversy over a United Kingdom ad for menstrual hygiene product that used red instead of blue liquid to illustrate absorbency).
222. It is notable that even Massachusetts—one of the few states not to impose a tampon
tax—does not even include menstrual hygiene products on its statutory list of exempted
products; they are only mentioned in the official Massachusetts Department of Revenue
Guide. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
223. 594 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
224. Id. at 1354–55, 1357–58.
225. Id. at 1358 (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270
(1993)).
226. See Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 508–11 (describing manifestations of
ignorance and anxiety about women’s bodies arising out of “the specter of a specifically female adult who cannot control bodily effluvia”).
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Additionally, it is important to note that in other unsuccessful
disparate impact cases like Feeney, there was at least a genuine
public policy interest motivating the differential treatment. 227 For
example, in Feeney, there was no debate that a veterans’ preference
policy for civil service positions served significant policy goals, notwithstanding the disparate impact on women. 228 The tampon tax,
however, serves no larger policy goal. Of course, the ultimate goal
of the sales tax system is to bring in as much revenue as possible,
and any exemption cuts against that goal. In light of all of the other
exemptions, however—from true necessities to randomly favored
items like garter belts 229 and manicures 230—it strains credulity to
argue that the tampon tax is the cornerstone of a state’s sales tax
system. Indeed, as discussed below, excluding tampons from a regime where other necessities are tax-exempt does not pass even
rational basis review.
Finally, the Supreme Court has itself backed away slightly from
the “intent” requirement in some recent cases. As Carlos Ball has
written, the Obergefell Court did not focus on “the intent or motivation[s]” behind the same-sex marriage bans; instead, it “focuse[d] on the effects” of the laws. 231 Lau and Li situate Obergefell
in the context of several other recent opinions that have “blur[red]
the line between facial discrimination and disparate impact,” 232
such as retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lawrence v. Texas. 233 In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor viewed
Texas’s criminalization of same-sex sodomy as an equal protection
violation even though it technically applied to everyone and did not
mention sexual orientation. 234 Justice O’Connor “did not resort to
analyzing motive,” Lau and Li write. 235 “Instead, she tersely stated
that engaging in same-sex sodomy is ‘closely correlated with being
homosexual’ and, therefore, that the law is discriminatory. Put differently, Justice O’Connor’s conclusion stems from the nature of
227. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) (explaining Massachusetts’ veterans’ preference statute).
228. See id. (describing the veterans’ preference statute and its disparate impact on
women).
229. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
230. Id.
231. Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 639, 649 (2016).
232. Lau & Li, supra note 189, at 1253, 1260–61.
233. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing
that Texas’ anti-sodomy law had the effect of discriminating against homosexual people).
234. Id. at 581.
235. Lau & Li, supra note 189, at 1261.
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the law’s impact on homosexuals, regardless of the law’s motivations.” 236 In a forthcoming essay, Lau similarly emphasizes the
shift from the reasoning in Loving v. Virginia—where the Supreme
Court focused on the formal language of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law and its intent—to Obergefell’s focus on effects. 237 This
analysis further supports the argument that plaintiffs challenging
the tampon tax should not have to uncover and prove the legislators’ precise intent in order to make the claim that the tampon tax
should be struck down due to its disparate impact on women.
Therefore, whether the tampon tax is viewed as a facial sexbased classification or as a facially neutral classification with a disparate impact on sex, it should trigger intermediate scrutiny. Indeed, the facial classification and facial neutrality analyses here
are mutually reinforcing and point toward that same conclusion.
Just as the Obergefell Court blended aspects of the facial classification and facial neutrality doctrines in holding that the same-sex
marriage bans violated the Equal Protection Clause, so too they
can be intertwined here. The tampon tax implicates both lines of
reasoning, illustrating the problematic nature of the tax.
C. The Failure to Satisfy Intermediate Scrutiny
Because the tampon tax should be viewed as a sex-based classification—under a facial classification model, a facial neutrality
model, or a combination thereof—it should trigger intermediate
scrutiny. And because it cannot satisfy intermediate scrutiny, it is
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has been clear that intermediate scrutiny is
a challenging standard. As noted above, in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg described it as “skeptical scrutiny” that requires an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” 238 There is no exceedingly persuasive justification for taxing menstrual hygiene
products more heavily than other necessities. On the contrary, doing so is precisely counter to the types of justifications that the Virginia Court said could pass intermediate scrutiny’s muster, including “compensat[ing] women ‘for particular economic disabilities
236. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 534 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
237. Holning Lau, From Loving to Obergefell: Elevating the Significance of Discriminatory Effects, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3200809 [https://perma.cc/G86B-AFSK].
238. 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
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[they have] suffered,’ ‘promot[ing] equal employment opportunity,’
[or] to advanc[ing] full development of the talent and capacities of
our Nation’s people.” 239 The tampon tax “perpetuate[s] the legal,
social, and economic inferiority of women,” which is exactly what
the Virginia Court deemed impermissible. 240
Indeed, the Court’s language in Virginia highlights precisely
what is so problematic about the tampon tax. Rather than compensating women for previous economic disabilities, the tax continues
to harm them economically. 241 And the tax sends the message that
products enabling women to leave their house and participate in
society are not necessities, but luxuries. The tax thus stifles the
full development of women’s talent and capacities. It cannot survive intermediate scrutiny.
V. TAXATION AND INEQUALITY
A. Why the Tampon Tax Lacks a Rational Basis
The refusal to treat menstrual hygiene products as necessities is
likely connected to at least some level of animus toward the female
biological process of menstruation. 242 Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the tampon tax is not viewed as a sex-based classification triggering intermediate scrutiny, it should still fail rational
basis review. Indeed, the tampon tax is reminiscent of the “rational
basis with bite” Supreme Court cases, in which the Court applied
rational basis review more stringently because it suspected that
animus toward a disfavored group was playing a role in the challenged governmental classification. 243 In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 244 for instance, Congress amended
the Food Stamp Act to exclude from participation any household
containing an individual who was unrelated to anyone else in the
household. 245 The Supreme Court held that this change violated
239. Id. at 533–34 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289
(1987); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam)).
240. Id. at 534.
241. See supra Part I.B.
242. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
243. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term–Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 18–19 (1972) (describing the development of rational basis “with bite”).
244. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
245. Id. at 529–30.
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the Equal Protection Clause, stating that it failed rational basis
review because of the legislative history indicating that it was designed to prevent people in “hippie communes” from receiving benefits. 246 Even though the change obviously would have saved the
United States money—by reducing the number of benefit recipients—that fiscal effect alone was insufficient to save it. 247 Similarly, the tax revenue from the tampon tax should not be enough
to sustain its constitutionality, particularly given that it likely
stems from discomfort with menstruation, a natural biological process of members of female sex.
Procedurally, making menstrual hygiene products exempt from
sales tax would not require a massive legislative overhaul, as illustrated by the five jurisdictions that have recently made the change.
The thirty-five states that currently tax these products 248 would
merely need to modify their sales tax laws to move menstrual hygiene products into the category of tax-exempt “necessities” like
prescription drugs and groceries or create a specific statutory exemption for them. 249
B. The Expressive Value of the Tampon Tax
A society signals its values through the decisions it makes about
whom and what to tax. 250 Indeed, Windsor v. United States—the
landmark Supreme Court case striking down the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)—was a tax case. 251 After Thea Speyer died in
2009 and left her entire estate to her spouse, Edith Windsor, the

246. Id. at 534–35, 538.
247. Id. at 538.
248. See supra Part I.B.
249. See id.
250. Republican Congresswoman Jennifer Dunn of Washington framed the relationship
between the tax system and it larger implications by asking, “How should we tax? Who
should we tax? What should we tax? What values does our tax system reflect?” Jennifer
Dunn, quoted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 42 (2005). Fordham Law Review recently sponsored
a symposium and devoted an entire issue to discussion of the notion that “We Are What We
Tax.” See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
2413, 2413–14 (2016); see also Kitty Richards, An Expressive Theory of Tax, 27 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 303 (2017) (“Like every other area of law, tax law offers policymakers
a chance to give expression to the values of their constituents and themselves—and the
values expressed by the tax code are at least as central to the tax policy preferences of citizens, lawmakers, and judges as economic efficiency and the distribution of income.”).
251. 570 U.S. 744, 750–51, 775.
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United States government denied the estate the benefit of the federal tax deduction that effectively allows for tax-free transfers to a
surviving spouse. 252 This denial resulted from section 3 of DOMA,
which defined “marriage” as a union between one man and one
woman only. 253 Windsor was required to pay $363,500 in estate
taxes that she would not have paid had she been in an opposite-sex
marriage, and she sued for an estate tax refund. 254
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled five to four in favor of the
estate, declaring section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. 255 In ruling
that DOMA failed to satisfy rational basis review, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion emphasized the affront to “the dignity and
integrity of the person” by refusing same-sex married couples the
same preferential tax treatment as opposite-sex married couples. 256 Windsor thus illustrates how tax law can bring discrimination clearly into focus. The tax system’s choices about whom and
252. Id. at 750–51; see I.R.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. V 2018) (estate tax deduction for transfers
to a surviving spouse).
253. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012 & Supp. V 2018), invalidated by Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
254. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 750–53.
255. Id. at 747, 775.
256. Id. at 772 (“DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other
reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity
and integrity of the person. And DOMA contrives to deprive some couples married under
the laws of their State, but not other couples, of both rights and responsibilities. By creating
two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples
to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law,
thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has
found it proper to acknowledge and protect.”). Noa Ben-Asher has critiqued the Windsor
Court’s analysis as a form of “weak dignity.” Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 276–77 (2014) (“Windsor’s dignity is . . . conferred by the State and at each state’s discretion . . . [it] is much narrower in scope than contemporary theories of dignity promoted by legal and moral
philosophers . . . [and it] comes with unnecessary rhetoric of injured subjects, a rhetoric that
could perpetuate an attachment to injury by homosexual couples and other rights-seeking
legal subjects.”).
The majority opinion also relied on principles of federalism. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768
(“DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next. Despite these considerations,
it is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the
Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance. The State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism.”).
For an analysis of the federalism rationale in Windsor, see Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor,
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what to tax not only reflect existing equalities or inequalities, but
reinforce and perpetuate them. 257
That broader lens further clarifies why the tampon tax cannot
pass intermediate scrutiny or even rational basis review. To be
sure, having a robust sales tax base is necessary for the integrity
of the system. The more exemptions that a legislature creates, the
weaker the tax base is. 258 Put differently, in order to generate maximum revenue, the greatest number of items should be subject to
Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 158 (2013), noting:
[C]ivil rights advocates dodged a bullet when the Windsor Court declined to
embrace the categorical family status federalism theory. While its acceptance
would have brought along the short-term gain of providing a basis for invalidating DOMA, it also would have curtailed the ability of federal officials to
protect same-sex couples and other families.
Some scholars have criticized the majority opinion for failure to engage in a meaningful
equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United
States v. Windsor: Law as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the Defense
of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 351, 461 (2013) (noting that Justice Scalia’s
dissent critiquing the majority opinion for failure to resolve the question of what level of
review applies to a claimed violation of equal protection on the basis of sexual orientation is
partially correct, insofar as “the majority declines to use Windsor as a vehicle to establish
that constitutional theory” of equal protection”). For a demonstration of how Windsor could
have been resolved on an equal protection basis using only the facts and precedent in existence at the time of the original opinion, see Ruthann Robson, United States v. Windsor, in
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS 306–16, 312 (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017) (rewriting decision of the Supreme Court to provide that “equal
protection challenges on the basis of sexual orientation classifications deserve intermediate
scrutiny, similar to the gender and sex classifications that sexual orientation classifications
resemble and upon which they rely,” and explaining applicable precedent that leads to that
result).
257. See, e.g., Introduction, in CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, at xxi (Anthony
C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009) (describing as among the goals of critical tax
scholarship the desire “to explore and expose how the tax laws both reflect and construct
social meaning”); see also ANDRE L. SMITH, TAX LAW AND RACIAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE: BLACK
TAX 3 (2015) (explaining the role of critical tax theory in “exposing when and where neutrally worded tax laws create, maintain or exacerbate disparate economic impacts relating
to race”); Bridget Crawford (@ProfBCrawford), TWITTER (June 26, 2018, 1:05 PM), https://
twitter.com/ProfBCrawford/status/1011702004006219779 [https://perma.cc/9LU2-LFHW]
(“#CriticalTax theorists try to point out that #tax law reflects and constitutes the society
that produces it. The tax system is deeply implicated in discrimination based on race, gender, disability, immigration status.”).
258. See, e.g., Kaeding, supra note 208 (“An ideal sales tax should apply to all final consumer purchases, without regard to whether items are classified as ‘necessities’ or ‘luxuries.’’’). A tax system that makes no distinction between taxable and nontaxable sales is
nondistortive. Id. (explaining that tax system with a broad base “does not favor one type of
consumption over another, meaning that a consumer does not have to choose between one
item that is taxed versus another item that isn’t taxed”). If the law does not make judgments
about what items are “necessities,” and thus exempt from sales tax, then taxation will play
no role in a purchaser’s choice to consume one product over another, all other factors being
equal. See id. Also, if all states had a broad sales tax base with no exemptions, there would
be a reduction of distortion caused by purchasers who are willing to travel to a nontax jurisdiction in order to avoid their home state’s sales tax. See, e.g., Michael Smart, Lessons in
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the sales tax. But that fiscal interest alone should not be enough
to satisfy rational basis review, just as the United States’ interest
in collecting $363,500 in federal estate taxes from Edith Windsor
was insufficient. 259 The rationality of the basis for collecting that
money matters, too. And given that the thirty-five states with the
tampon tax already exempt other items as necessities, the refusal
to include menstrual hygiene products on that list is irrational. 260
There is no serious dispute about whether menstrual hygiene products are necessities. When a state imposes a tax on a product that
a woman needs solely because she is a woman, the state is, in effect, taxing her for being female.
Because the tampon tax is highly salient and the discriminatory
impact is one that consumers can easily quantify, 261 repealing the
Harmony: What Experience in the Atlantic Provinces Shows About the Harmonized Sales
Tax, 253 C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT. 1, 5 (2007) (describing distortion that occurs when
adjacent jurisdictions have different tax bases or rates and consumers engage in strategic
behavior to minimize incidence of taxation). This “forum shopping” applies only if the home
jurisdiction lacks a use tax or if the taxpayer fails to comply with reporting and payment
obligations under the use tax system and the non-compliance remains undetected.
On the difference between a sales use tax and a consumer’s obligation to report and pay
tax on items purchased outside the domiciliary jurisdiction, see, for example, M. Patrick
Wilson & Christopher Price, Local Government Sales and Use Taxes, 40 COLO. LAW. 61–62
& nn.8–14 (2011) (describing Colorado’s complex sales and use tax system); Thimmesch,
supra note 33 (explaining that use taxes are typically involved in state taxation of online
sales). There would remain an incentive to travel in order to take advantage of any differences in sales tax rates, if states continued to tax at different rates, but presumably this
behavior would be less frequent than in a regime in which there are both different rates and
jurisdictions that retain sales tax exemptions. Given that five states have no income tax at
all, it is unlikely that even a unified rate combined with a tax base without sales tax exemptions would completely eliminate strategic behavior. See, e.g., id. A move to a sales tax base
with zero exemptions is politically unlikely, however. See, e.g., Kaeding, supra note 208 (explaining that “this idea of exempting necessities is a political one, not an economic one”).
259. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753. After the Obama administration announced that it would
not defend the constitutionality of DOMA, the Bipartisan Law Advisory Group (“BLAG”)
intervened in the case. Id. at 754; see also Jennifer Bendery, Defense of Marriage Act:
House Republicans Tie Federal Gay Marriage Ban to House Rules, HUFFPOST (Jan.
2, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/defense-of-marriage-act_n_2399383.html
[https://perma.cc/FNN9-DT4F] (describing House Republican Conference decision to pay
outside counsel to represent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in defending DOMA).
Note that in its attempt to defend DOMA, BLAG argued that DOMA was substantially related to the important government interest of protecting the fisc. See Windsor v. United
States, 699 F.3d 169, 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit rejected that argument,
stating that DOMA was not substantially related to fiscal matters, and even if it were, “the
Supreme Court has held that ‘the saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification.’” Id. at 186. As the district court [in Windsor] observed, “excluding any
arbitrarily chosen group of individuals from a government program conserves government
resources.” Windsor, 699 F.3d at 186–87 (quoting Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d
394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
260. See supra Part I.B.
261. See Crawford & Spivack, supra note 43, at 546 (“Another reason that the movement
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tax would provide immediate financial relief to women and have a
powerful signaling effect. 262 Exempting menstrual hygiene products from sales taxation communicates that women are valued and
necessary participants in all aspects of public life, and that they
should no longer suffer a tax penalty on account of their biology. 263
To use Justice Ginsburg’s words, the exemption furthers the “full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.” 264
By contrast, the continued imposition of the sales tax on menstrual
hygiene products, while other products are exempted as necessities, exacerbates the aggregate economic inequality that already
exists between the sexes. 265 Maintaining that sales tax maintains
inequality.
CONCLUSION
Some critics have suggested that the tampon tax issue is too
small to merit significant attention. 266 We disagree. First, while a
to repeal the tampon tax has garnered so much support is that the issue is both concrete
and easy to understand. Women know how much they pay per month for menstrual hygiene
products and are outraged when they find out that similar products used primarily by men
are not subject to taxation. Thus, the issue of gender discrimination is reduced to dollars
and cents. The consequences are felt each month by every menstruating woman.”).
262. See generally Tsilly Dagan, The Currency of Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537
(2016) (describing ways that tax system communicates social and other values).
263. The same signaling effect occurs when a workplace, school, or other facility provides
no-cost menstrual hygiene products. See, e.g., Elizabeth Plank, If Men Had Their Period,
Would Tampons in Your Office Be Free?, MIC (Apr. 4, 2014), https://mic.com/articles/86
819/if-men-had-their-period-would-tampons-in-your-office-be-free [https://perma.cc/92GQVPKN] (quoting one marketing director about her corporation’s decision to provide free menstrual hygiene products in office bathrooms as saying, “A third of our staff is women, and
it’s something subtle that shows we’re a woman-friendly environment. It’s not unlike some
of the other employee perks we offer from cookies on your birthday to pizza and beer
nights.”). Yet while there is unanimous cultural consensus that these locations should provide toilet paper to employees, students, and guests, the same is not true with respect to
menstrual hygiene products. See Representative Sean Patrick Maloney, (@RepSeanMalon
ey), TWITTER (June 18, 2018, 11:55 AM), https://twitter.com/RepSeanMaloney/status/101
2409246112198656 [https://perma.cc/CVA6-5K3M] (“My office bought tampons for female
visitors and our staff. Then we got an email from @HouseAdmnGOP telling us we couldn’t
use funds to purchase a necessary hygiene product. That’s ridiculous.”).
264. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996).
265. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn et al., Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 430 (2018) (describing historical
patterns of economic inequality between men and women); Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 9 (2016) (identifying major trends in
gender and economic inequality in the twenty-first century including women’s declining employment rate, women’s lower pay for equal work, and greater rates of poverty among
women).
266. See, e.g., Miranda Stewart (@AusTaxProf), TWITTER (June 18, 2018, 4:00 PM), https:
//twitter.com/AusTaxProf/status/1008846954158219264
[https://perma.cc/LXU9-ZA7W]

CRAWFORDWALDMAN 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

488

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:37 PM

[Vol. 53:439

particular sales tax may seem small to a person with a steady job
that pays a living wage (or more), it can represent a significant
percentage of a jobless or homeless woman’s available assets. 267
Second, and relatedly, even if the tampon tax’s impact on each individual woman is small, the aggregate numbers are substantial.
California alone recently estimated that it was collecting $20 million in annual sales tax revenue from the tampon tax. 268 News outlets estimated that prior to the November 2018 ballot initiative in
Nevada, 269 the state collected between $4.96 million and $7.11 million annually on the sales of menstrual hygiene products. 270 Those
moneys collectively represent a significant equal protection violation—one occurring in the majority of other states as well.
If one is committed as a matter of principle to non-discrimination on the basis of gender, then the magnitude of the discrimination is not a solid theoretical basis on which to determine whether
the discrimination should be tolerated. Recall that the Supreme
Court first reached agreement that sex-based classifications
should trigger intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren, where Oklahoma was prohibiting males from buying nonintoxicating 3.2%
beer until they were twenty-one, even though females could do so
at age eighteen. 271 Arguably, that disparity did not reflect a pressing public policy concern—but imagine how different current law
might be had it not been challenged. Similarly, what if a female
high school student had never challenged her rejection from the
(“#Feminists should fight for a strong #income #tax system and broad based #GST to fund
public services—including #childcare. Exempting #tampons from #GST looks like a win for
women but is distracting and tiny compared to what we need for #gender equality[.]”).
267. See, e.g., Dasha Burns, Should Tampons Be Tax Free?, CNN (Mar. 4, 2016), https://
www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/opinions/tampon-tax-burns/index.html [https://perma.cc/4RHEYJMF] (“For low-income women, access to these ‘luxury’ goods can be a real challenge, especially since food stamps don’t cover feminine hygiene products.”); see also Christopher
Cotropia & Kyle Rozema, Who Benefits from Repealing Tampon Taxes? Empirical Evidence
from New Jersey, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 620, 639 (2018) (finding in one jurisdiction
that repealed its tax on menstrual hygiene products, the greatest beneficiaries were lowincome consumers).
268. See Kaeding, supra note 208.
269. See supra note 67.
270. See Jana Kasperkevic, Nevada’s “Tampon Tax” Ballot Initiative Brings Up Questions About Gender Equality, MARKETPLACE (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/
2018/11/01/elections/nevada-s-tampon-tax-ballot-initiative-brings-questions-about-fairness
-and [https://perma.cc/5YTS-QSXU] (using offical state estimates of 867,000 girls and
women in Nevada between the ages of twelve and fifty-five, and estimating a monthly expense of $7 to $10 per month per person, for a total of $6.1 million to $8.7 million in sanitary
napkins and pads each month; given a tax rate of 6.85 per cent, such expenditures would
generate between $4.96 million and $7.11 million in annual state sales tax revenue).
271. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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Virginia Military Institute? 272 Even today, only eleven percent of
VMI’s students are women, but the Supreme Court’s decision in
Virginia has had much broader implications. 273
History suggests that reducing discrimination requires multiple
challenges over a long period of time. 274 In other words, efforts to
repeal the tampon tax should be understood as part of a larger
strategy in reducing or eliminating discrimination on the basis of
gender. 275 Whether treating people differently for tax purposes
gives rise to a tax bill of more than $300,000 (as in Windsor) 276 or
$300 (as one might pay in taxation for a lifetime supply of menstrual hygiene products), 277 the disparity is unfair and violates the
Equal Protection Clause. The tampon tax is unconstitutional and
should be repealed in all states.

272. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996).
273. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements
on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (describing
the Rehnquist Court, over the objections of Chief Justice Rehnquist, as “just as vigorous as
the Burger Court was in carrying out the liberal feminist politics of recognition under cover
of the Equal Protection Clause”); Yoshino, supra note 196, at 756 n.61 (describing the intermediate scrutiny as articulated in United States v. Virginia as “quite close to strict scrutiny”); see also Abigail L. Perdue, Transforming “Shedets” into “Keydets”: An Empirical
Study Examining Coeducation Through the Lens of Gender Polarization, 28 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 371, 372 (2014) (describing entrenchment of gender roles as one result of coeducation at Virginia Military Institute, based on a survey of 364 VMI students); Michael
Kimmel, Saving the Males: The Sociological Implications of the Virginia Military Institute
and the Citadel, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y 494, 495–96 (2000) (describing larger social consequences of coeducating military academies); cf. Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1056 (2001) (suggesting absence of significant change in sex discrimination law).
274. See, e.g., Francine Lipman (@Narfnampil), TWITTER (June 21, 2018, 2:30 PM), https:
//twitter.com/Narfnampil/status/1009911465594109953 [https://perma.cc/TF4Z-A89R] (responding to critique that tampon tax repeal efforts should not be at the top of any reform
efforts by asking, “Why do we have to chose [sic] issues that are both important; movements/progress are incremental so pushing forward on a number of fronts for justice has
success.”).
275. See, e.g., Bridget Crawford (@ProfBCrawford), TWITTER (June 21, 2018, 2:35 PM),
https://twitter.com/ProfBCrawford/status/1009912748975755264 [https://perma.cc/7LZ9-63
FZ] (commenting on critique of efforts to repeal tampon tax that “[j]ustice must be capacious
enough for ‘both/and’ ‘not either/or’”).
276. See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 87 (providing estimate of lifetime cost of sales tax on menstrual hygiene products).

